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Abstract 
Alexithymia is a personality trait characterized by difficulties in processing emotional 
stimuli. Here, Experiment 1 shows that alexithymia has a significant impact on the life of 
individuals, being related to lower emotional intelligence, empathy and wellbeing. Also, 
Experiment 2 shows that alexithymia is related to the need for more emotional intensity to 
identify fear in facial expressions. Although these experiments contribute to the literature 
describing the difficulties of alexithymia, the basic mechanisms underlying such difficulties 
remain poorly understood. For this reason, the remaining of this thesis focuses on 
investigating whether differences in emotional learning may characterize alexithymia. 
Indeed, through emotional learning the internal representation of stimuli is shaped, so that 
neutral stimuli acquire emotional value. Impairment in this process has been reported in 
clinical conditions marked by difficulties in emotion processing; nevertheless, this has never 
been investigated in alexithymia. Given this, Experiment 3 shows that alexithymia is related 
to impairment in learning the aversive value of stimuli, evidenced by reduced physiological 
markers of emotional prediction in Pavlovian threat conditioning. On the contrary, 
Experiment 4 did not find such evidence, when learning appetitive value. Nevertheless, 
evidence for impairment in learning the appetitive value of stimuli was found in Experiment 
5, where electrophysiological markers of prediction and prediction error were assessed during 
Pavlovian reward conditioning. Finally, Experiment 6 examined the ability to learn the 
emotional value of actions during instrumental learning, and to use this learned value for 
adaptive behavior in a new context. Here, alexithymia was related to a difficulty in learning 
from punishment, marked by longer response time when having to avoid stimuli, which had 
previously acquired aversive value, encountered in a new context. Together, these results 
indicate impairment in emotional learning in alexithymia, which may be more severe for 
aversive than appetitive stimuli. The new insight provided by these results for the 
understanding of alexithymia is discussed. 
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Chapter 1. Alexithymia and its difficulties in emotion processing 
Alexithymia: Definition, assessment and prevalence 
The word alexithymia derives from the Greek a = lack, lexis = word, thymos = emotion. 
During the 1940s, the construct of alexithymia originated in the clinical context to describe 
patients, who appeared to have limited awareness of their emotions, to have difficulties in 
expressing them and to be less focused on their internal world and more preoccupied with 
physical experiences and details of the external environment (Panaite & Bylsma, 2012). 
These characteristics are still part of the current definition of alexithymia, which is now 
considered as a personality trait defined by three aspects: difficulty in identifying feelings, 
difficulty in describing them to others and a type of thinking focused more on concrete 
aspects regarding the external environment rather than on introspection on the internal mental 
life (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991). In agreement with this, the most widely 
used measure to assess alexithymia is the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, a questionnaire with 20 
items, answered on a 4 point Likert scale, comprising three subscales corresponding to its 
three aspects. Importantly, higher score on the measure indicates more difficulties in emotion 
processing and a cut-off of 61and above has been identified as indicating presence of 
alexithymia (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994).  
Studies on the general population of different countries suggest a prevalence of the 
trait ranging from 7% to 18% (Honkalampi, Hintikka, Tanskanen, Lehtonen, & Viinamäki, 
2000; Kokkonen et al., 2001; Mason, Tyson, Jones, & Potts, 2005; Salminen, Saarijärvi, 
Aärelä, Toikka, & Kauhanen, 1999), which increases significantly when examining clinical 
populations, such as individuals with anxiety (Berthoz, Consoli, Perez-Diaz, & Jouvent, 
1999), depression (Hendryx, Haviland, & Shaw, 1991; Honkalampi et al., 2000; S. Li, Zhang, 
Guo, & Zhang, 2015; Marchesi, Brusamonti, & Maggini, 2000), eating disorders and 
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substance abuse (Panaite & Bylsma, 2012), leading to the hypothesis that alexithymia might 
represent a subclinical condition that poses individuals at risk for developing such 
pathologies. Therefore, given the impact of alexithymia on the wellbeing of the general 
population, understanding the difficulties in emotion processing that characterize this 
personality trait and the underling mechanisms, which may give rise to such difficulties, 
appears of significant importance. 
Alexithymia affects multiple aspects of emotion processing 
Individuals with alexithymia appear to have difficulties in several domains of emotion 
processing spanning from the recognition of emotion, to the response to emotional stimuli, 
the regulation of such response and the appropriate use of emotions to guide decision making. 
Extensive research has shown that alexithymia affects the ability to recognize other’s 
emotions. For example, alexithymia appears related to worse performance in recognition of 
emotional facial expressions (EFEs) (Jessimer & Markham, 1997; Lane et al., 1996), 
specifically under temporal constraints (Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, 
Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; Swart, Kortekaas, & 
Aleman, 2009), which can be restored when stimulus exposure time is extended (Ihme, 
Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, & 
Suslow, 2014; Pandey & Mandal, 1997; P. D. Parker, Prkachin, & Prkachin, 2005). This 
suggests that alexithymia is associated to the need for more time to accurately recognize 
EFEs (Grynberg et al., 2012). Also, alexithymia has been associated with a failure in the 
modulation of early visual event related potentials (ERPs), recorded with 
electroencephalography, in response to emotional body postures (Borhani, Borgomaneri, 
Làdavas, & Bertini, 2016) as well as failure in the modulation of  ERPs related to error 
monitoring in response to EFEs (Maier, Scarpazza, Starita, Filogamo, & Làdavas, 2016). In 
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addition to visual perception, difficulties have been found in the perception of emotions 
conveyed through the auditory modality. In fact, alexithymia is associated to decreased 
performance in the identification of emotional prosody (Goerlich, Aleman, & Martens, 2012) 
and differences in ERP components related to the processing of emotional prosody (Goerlich 
et al., 2012, 2012; Goerlich-Dobre et al., 2014) and emotional sounds more in general 
(Schäfer, Schneider, Tress, & Franz, 2007). 
Concerning the response to emotional stimuli, physiological arousal to emotional 
stimuli has been examined. Although some studies report no difference in autonomic 
response in alexithymia (Bausch et al., 2011; Easterbrooks, Chaudhuri, & Gestsdottir, 2005; 
Stone & Nielson, 2001), others found decreased physiological response to emotional stimuli 
(Bermond, Bierman, Cladder, Moormann, & Vorst, 2010; Franz, Schaefer, & Schneider, 
2003; Neumann, Sollers III, Thayer, & Waldstein, 2004; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos, 
Schubö, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2008). In addition, when the information from the 
physiological arousal is integrated with the subjective reports of emotional response, 
alexithymia appears to be characterized by a decoupling between the subjective experience 
and physiological reactivity (Eastabrook, Lanteigne, & Hollenstein, 2013), with subjective 
reports of greater negative emotional experience relative to physiological arousal (Connelly 
& Denney, 2007; Eastabrook et al., 2013; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2011). 
Turning to the response to others’ emotions, it is possible that the impairment in emotion 
perception may affect empathic response. Indeed, alexithymia appears negatively correlated 
with empathy (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010; Patil & Silani, 
2014b), with individuals with alexithymia exhibiting significantly lower scores on empathic 
concern and the ability to adopt the perspective of the other when compared to those without 
alexithymia, while having higher scores on the distress experienced during emotionally 
intense situations (Moriguchi et al., 2006, 2007). 
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Individuals with alexithymia have also difficulties in regulating their response to 
emotional stimuli, being more likely to recur to maladaptive cognitive strategies, such as 
repression, as opposed to adaptive ones, such as reappraisal (Swart et al., 2009). In addition, 
when specifically asked to implement reappraisal, they fail to report a decrease in emotional 
arousal and to show a corresponding modulation of brain ERPs, which is instead observed in 
participants without alexithymia (Pollatos & Gramann, 2012). 
Finally, the difficulties of alexithymic individuals in emotion processing affect also 
decision making. Indeed, emotions play a crucial role in decision making, where somatic 
changes occurring when pondering a decision guide our behavior to make adaptive choices 
(Damasio, 2008) and the differences in physiological response to emotional stimuli in 
alexithymia, might also impair decision making. Specifically, individuals with alexithymia 
rate utilitarian decisions as more acceptable in moral dilemmas (Patil & Silani, 2014b, 
2014a), they fail to consolidate learning about advantageous and disadvantageous choices in 
gambling tasks (Ferguson et al., 2009) and have stronger preference to choose small rewards 
immediately available over larger rewards that require a wait time to be obtained (Scarpazza, 
Sellitto, & di Pellegrino, 2017) compared to individuals without alexithymia. 
Neural correlates of alexithymia 
To better characterize alexithymia, research has also investigated the brain regions that 
correlate with the alexithymic trait, when processing emotional stimuli in a broad range of 
tasks. In particular, a recent meta-analysis has suggested a central role of the amygdala, the 
insula and the anterior cingulate cortex among the regions underlying difficulties in 
alexithymia (van der Velde et al., 2013). 
The amygdala is an almond shape structure comprising several sub-nuclei and it is 
located in the medial part of the temporal lobe (LeDoux, 2007). This structure has long been 
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known to play a crucial role in processing emotional stimuli. Indeed, lesion to the amygdala 
impairs accurate perception of emotional facial expressions (Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs et al., 
1999; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994) and memory for emotional events 
(Adolphs, Denburg, & Tranel, 2001). In alexithymia, several studies have reported decreased 
activation of the amygdala in response to the presentation of emotional facial expressions 
(Jongen et al., 2014; Kugel et al., 2008), negative emotional stimuli (Moriguchi & Komaki, 
2013; van der Velde et al., 2013; Wingbermühle, Theunissen, Verhoeven, Kessels, & Egger, 
2012) and in particular fearful ones (Pouga, Berthoz, de Gelder, & Grèzes, 2010), supporting 
its role as a structure underlying the difficulties of alexithymic individuals. 
The insula is a cortical ‘island’ located within the lateral sulcus and appears to have a 
central role in interoception and interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2002, 2003; Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004). Because of this, it has been argued that the insula 
supports the representation of physical sensations as affective states (Barrett, 2017b). As 
such, the insula receives and relays information regarding the internal state of the body 
(Craig, 2002, 2003) and has found to be responsive in tasks involving viewing others in pain 
(Bernhardt & Singer, 2012) or disgust (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 
2012). Given the tendency of individuals with alexithymia to fail to distinguish between 
bodily arousal and emotional states (Sifneos, 1973), it is not surprising that differences in 
activity of this region have been correlated with the personality trait. In particular, insular 
activation appeared to decrease with increasing alexithymia when viewing emotional facial 
expressions (Reker et al., 2010), while it appeared to increase with increasing alexithymia 
when viewing others in pain (Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Together these studies 
support a difference in insular activity in alexithymia, which may vary in direction depending 
on the experimental conditions. 
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Finally, the anterior cingulate cortex, located in the medial frontal lobe, appears 
involved in awareness of core affective state (Lindquist et al., 2012). Although, neuroimaging 
studies have found both increased (Mériau et al., 2006; Pouga et al., 2010) and decreased 
(Moriguchi et al., 2007) activation of this region in alexithymia, a meta-analysis suggested 
that alexithymia may be indeed related to increased activation in this region, reflecting 
increased cognitive demand to process emotional stimuli (van der Velde et al., 2013). This 
result would be in keeping with a theoretical account of alexithymia, the so called ‘blind-feel’ 
hypothesis, which claims that , alexithymia would be characterized by an intact physiological 
response and a deficit in emotion concept representation (Lane, Ahern, Schwartz, & 
Kaszniak, 1997; Lane, Weihs, Herring, Hishaw, & Smith, 2015). 
The current issue: from describing alexithymia to understanding alexithymia 
Although a large body of research is accumulating showing that alexithymia is related to 
difficulties in various domains of emotion processing, less attention has been devoted to 
understanding the basic mechanisms that may underlie such difficulties.  
In the wake of the theory of embodied emotion, which argues that perceiving and 
thinking about emotion involve perceptual, somatovisceral, and motor re-experiencing of the 
emotion in the self (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 
2009), studies have suggested that alexithymia may be the manifestation of underlying  
differences in the embodied aspects of emotions. Indeed, the studies investigating the 
physiological response to emotional stimuli have shown partly impaired interoceptive 
response to emotional stimuli (Bermond et al., 2010; Franz et al., 2003; Neumann et al., 
2004; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2008). In addition, the difficulties in 
emotion perception has been suggested to result from differences in emotion mimicry, i.e. the 
activation of the somatosensory system, when viewing another’s emotional expression, which 
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usually simulates the other’s emotions in ourselves (Adolphs, 2002). Several studies found 
impairment in such response alexithymia, which appears to be decreased for fear and 
enhanced for disgust (Scarpazza, di Pellegrino, & Làdavas, 2014; Scarpazza, Làdavas, & 
Cattaneo, 2017; Scarpazza, Làdavas, & Pellegrino, 2015). Instead, other studies argue that 
alexithymia may be related to a broader impairment in interoception, because the ability to 
perceive physiological signals from the body appears decreased also in non-emotional 
context (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2017; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & 
Bird, 2016). 
Indeed, differences in emotion embodiment may be one process underlying the 
difficulties in alexithymia. However, these differences have been investigated with stimuli, 
such as emotional facial expressions, which elicit an emotional response, not because of their 
intrinsic properties, but because individuals usually learn to attribute them emotional value 
(Barrett, 2017a), by actively constructing the internal representation of such stimuli through a 
process named emotional learning (LeDoux, 1998). Given this, a further step deeper in the 
understanding of alexithymia can be taken, by investigating whether alexithymia is 
characterized by differences in the construction of the internal representation of emotional 
stimuli. 
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Chapter 2. Understanding the construction of the internal representation of 
emotional stimuli to understand alexithymia 
Emotional stimuli can be defined as stimuli that have relevance for the survival of the 
organism, such as a predator or food. These stimuli are named unconditioned stimuli (UCS) 
because they are biologically prepared to elicit an emotional response (LeDoux, 1998), which 
is marked by interoceptive (e.g. increase arousal), motor (e.g. avoid the threat) and cognitive 
(e.g. subjective feeling) changes in the organism, occurring in order to promote its survival 
(Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010). Nevertheless, in our daily life, countless stimuli can 
elicit an emotional response, from seeing the frowning expression of a friend to receiving a 
‘like’ for the latest picture we posted on social media. This is because, to increase the chances 
of survival, we usually expand the range of emotional stimuli, from those that 
unconditionally elicit an emotional response to those that are often associated with them, 
actively constructing the internal representation of emotional stimuli. This process is called 
associative emotional learning.  
Associative emotional learning 
In associative emotional learning a neutral stimulus or behavior is repeatedly associated to an 
UCS, such as an aversive or appetitive stimulus. As a consequence, the emotional response 
that is first observed in reaction to the presentation of the appetitive or aversive stimulus is 
then transferred on the neutral stimulus or behavior (e.g. Seymour et al., 2004), which is now 
named conditioned stimulus (CS) or behavior (Pavlov & Anrep, 1927). Ultimately, the 
internal representation of the neutral stimulus or behavior is changed acquiring emotional 
value. 
Associative emotional learning is a fundamental adaptive mechanism because the CS 
can be used to predict coming UCS, enabling the organism to appropriately prepare to 
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respond to the predicted UCS, rather than to simply react to these, once they have occurred 
(McNally & Westbrook, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Nevertheless, for such mechanism 
to be adaptive, the internal representation of the stimuli need to be accurate and the associated 
predictions precise. To ensure this, the representation of the stimuli also acts as internal 
model against which to compare new incoming information. Every time an UCS is predicted, 
this prediction is compared against the incoming information and, if there is a discrepancy 
between the two, a prediction error is computed, which drives learning by indicating that the 
internal representation needs to be updated (Friston, 2010). Given this predictive properties of 
the internal representation, constructing accurate internal representation of emotional stimuli 
is not only crucial for effective recognition, response and response regulation to the 
emotional stimuli per se, but also for anticipating the consequences of these stimuli enabling 
optimal decision making (Bubic et al., 2010). In sum, accurate predictions and prediction 
errors during emotional learning are the basis to construct accurate internal representations of 
emotional stimuli. 
Among the various forms of associative emotional learning, two are particularly 
relevant for this dissertation. The first is Pavlovian conditioning, in which the organism 
learns contingencies between two stimuli, i.e. a neutral stimulus and a UCS. Here, learning is 
generally assessed by physiological changes in autonomic nervous system activity, such as in 
skin conductance response (SCR) (LeDoux, 2014; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Before learning, 
an increase in SCR is observed in response to the UCS. Following learning the sole 
presentation of the neutral stimulus elicits the increase in SCR, signaling increased 
expectations regarding the occurrence of UCS following the presentation of the neutral 
stimulus, which has now become a CS (S. S. Y. Li & McNally, 2014). The second form of 
associative learning is instrumental learning, in which the organism learns contingencies 
between a behavior and a UCS. Here, learning is generally assessed by the way in which the 
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UCS affects behavior. Specifically, a behavior associated to an appetitive UCS should be 
repeated, while one associated to an aversive UCS should be terminated (Daw & Tobler, 
2014). 
In addition to changes in physiological response during Pavlovian conditioning and 
behavior during instrumental learning, changes in subjective experience can also mark 
emotional learning. According to recent cognitive theories of emotional experience, the 
subjective experience of emotion is a cognitive construction based on conceptualization of 
situations (Barrett, 2017a, 2017b; Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007) or a higher-
order cognitive interpretation that emerges from the integration in working memory of lower-
order information, coming from within the body and the external environment (LeDoux, 
1998; LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). For example, an aversive 
stimulus, such as physical pain, triggers a defensive response, such as flight response, and 
interoceptive changes, such as increase in physiological arousal, release of cortisol etc. 
Nevertheless, the response, the stimulus that caused it and the context require cognitive 
interpretation to generate an instance of fear. Importantly, the lower-order information is 
generally used to give rise to a coherent higher-order subjective emotional experience; 
nevertheless, because of the multiple sources contributing to the lower-order information, the 
information coming from any individual source may not find direct correspondence in the 
higher-order subjective emotional experience (LeDoux & Brown, 2017). For example, 
patients with split brain (Làdavas, Cimatti, Pesce, & Tuozzi, 1993), hemispatial neglect 
(Tamietto et al., 2015) and affective blindsight (Bertini, Cecere, & Làdavas, 2013; Cecere, 
Bertini, Maier, & Làdavas, 2014; Tamietto et al., 2009) show intact physiological response to 
emotional stimuli, despite the absence of awareness for them, but they do not show any fear 
in their subjective emotional experience. 
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Neural correlates of associative emotional learning 
Several brain regions underlie emotional learning, including the insula, amygdala, anterior 
cingulate cortex and the striatum. Importantly, although the role of each region has been 
studied mainly in relation to distinct aspects of learning, they all have reciprocal direct and 
indirect neural connections, likely constituting a complex intertwined circuit in which activity 
of each region can be modulated by the others. 
The insula and the representation of interoceptive changes associated with unconditioned 
stimuli 
The insula receives information regarding bodily changes elicited by a broad range of 
appetitive stimuli, such as sensual touch, and aversive stimuli, such as pain (Craig, 2002, 
2003; Critchley et al., 2004). In addition, activation of the insula has been found both during 
the anticipation of aversive (Büchel, Dolan, Armony, & Friston, 1999) and appetitive (Kirsch 
et al., 2003) stimuli during pavlovian conditioning, which appeared modulated by awareness 
of the conditioned stimuli, suggesting a role for this structure also in the explicit awareness of 
an external emotional event (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002). So the insula might be 
involved in processing and predicting interoceptive changes associated with the occurrence of 
UCS. 
Interestingly, a study found stronger activation of the insula during instructed than 
pavlovian conditioning, where participants learn contingencies between conditioned and 
unconditioned stimuli through verbal instruction instead of direct experience (Phelps et al., 
2001). Authors argued that this difference in activation may suggest a more important role for 
the insula in the cognitive representation of the aversive properties of UCS and the associated 
emotional feeling, which may then be relayed to the amygdala. Indeed, the insula has been 
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suggested as crucial for the representation of physical sensations as affective states (Barrett, 
2017b) and the conscious subjective experience of emotion (LeDoux & Brown, 2017). 
The amygdala and the acquisition and expression of the association between conditioned 
and unconditioned stimuli  
The amygdala plays a pivotal role in emotional learning, both in pavlovian conditioning 
(Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 2002) and instrumental learning (Averbeck & Costa, 
2017), being involved in the acquisition of the association between the neutral stimulus or 
behavior and appetitive (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Murray & Baxter, 2002; 
Seymour & Dolan, 2008) as well as aversive unconditioned stimuli (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, 
LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Contrary to the insula, its activation 
appears independent of awareness of the CS (Critchley et al., 2002), suggesting its 
importance in the implicit processing of salient stimuli (LeDoux, 2007).  
In particular, its role has mostly being studied in Pavlovian conditioning. Here the 
basolateral complex of the amygdala appears to be the site of association between CS and 
UCS receiving sensory inputs from multiple modalities and responding to conditioned stimuli 
associated to aversive as well as appetitive stimuli (Paton, Belova, Morrison, & Salzman, 
2006). Its projections then influence the central complex of the amygdala, which seems to 
modulate physiological changes in the autonomic nervous system (e.g. skin conductance 
response) through its connections with hypothalamus (Cardinal et al., 2002; McNally & 
Westbrook, 2006). In addition, its projections to the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex are 
thought to influence behavioral responses of approach and avoidance and decision making 
(Cardinal et al., 2002).  
Importantly, single cell recording in animals has shown that some neurons in the 
basolateral complex of the amygdala may process the valence of UCS. Indeed, while some 
18 
 
neurons respond to both appetitive and aversive UCS, others respond preferentially to one 
valence over the other. Specifically, neurons projecting to the central complex of the 
amygdala seem to respond preferentially to aversive stimuli, while those projecting to the 
nucleus accumbens to appetitive stimuli (Beyeler et al., 2016; Namburi et al., 2015). This 
evidence suggests that although the amygdala is involved in learning from positive as well as 
negative emotional stimuli, these may be processed by partly distinct neural circuits. For 
example, while human lesion studies provide evidence of a causal role of the amygdala in the 
acquisition of aversive conditioning measured through SCR (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar, 
LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995), the causal role of the amygdala in the acquisition of 
reward conditioning is less definitive (Murray & Baxter, 2002; though see Bechara et al., 
1999). 
The anterior cingulate cortex and the computation of prediction errors 
Once the association between CS and UCS has been acquired, the CS becomes predictor of 
the coming UCS enabling the organism to prepare to respond to it. In this regard, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) has been proposed to represent predictions of future events, signaling 
prediction errors in response to the unexpected non-occurrence of predicted events 
(Alexander & Brown, 2014). When a predicted event does not occur, a prediction error 
signals the need to update the prediction and connections between ACC and amygdala can 
modulate changes in the acquisition of CS-UCS association. 
Neuroimaging studies have shown activation of this area during anticipation of pain in 
aversive conditioning (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 
2011; Milad et al., 2007) and of monetary reward during appetitive conditioning (Kirsch et 
al., 2003). In addition, electrophysiological studies provide evidence that activity originating 
from this area is related to brain components (Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004), 
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which appear to code prediction error signals, being characterized by a negative deflection in 
electrical potential that is enhanced following the violation of predictions (Garofalo, Maier, & 
di Pellegrino, 2014; Garofalo, Timmermann, Battaglia, Maier, & di Pellegrino, 2016; 
Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Holroyd & 
Krigolson, 2007; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; Talmi, Atkinson, & El-
Deredy, 2013).  
The striatum and the expression of motivated behavior 
The emotional value acquired by the CS can influence behavior. If the CS has acquired 
appetitive value, the organism will engage in approaching behavior to collect the reward, on 
the contrary it will engage in avoidance behavior to escape the danger, in case the CS had 
acquired aversive value. The striatum has been suggested to mediate such motivational 
behavior (Cardinal et al., 2002) and for this reason its role has been largely investigated in 
instrumental learning. 
While extensive neuroimaging studies suggest that the striatum mediates reward 
seeking behaviors (Delgado, 2007; Knutson & Cooper, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004), there is 
accumulating evidence that it is also fundamental for the anticipation of pain (Seymour et al., 
2004) and threat avoidance behaviors (Delgado et al., 2009; Reynolds & Berridge, 2008). In 
particular, prediction error signals, carried by dopaminergic neurons originating in the 
substantia nigra (Schultz, 1998, 2016), would converge onto the striatum to drive learning. In 
the dorsal striatum, prediction errors would support acquisition of stimulus-response-reward 
contingencies, promoting the repetition of actions that are more likely to result in a reward; in 
the ventral striatum they would update stimulus-reward association more broadly (O’Doherty 
et al., 2004). In addition, similarly to neurons in the amygdala, single cell recording has 
shown that largely distinct populations of neurons in the nucleus accumbens, part of the 
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ventral striatum, encode stimuli that have acquired either aversive or rewarding value, 
suggesting also in this region partly separate encoding of stimulus valence (Namburi, Al-
Hasani, Calhoon, Bruchas, & Tye, 2016). 
Rethinking alexithymia: alexithymia as impairment in constructing the internal 
representation of emotional stimuli 
Impairments in emotional learning have been highlighted in a number of psychiatric 
conditions related to difficulties in emotion processing (Heinz, Schlagenhauf, Beck, & 
Wackerhagen, 2016), such as depression (Greenberg et al., 2015), anxiety (Lissek et al., 
2005, 2014) and psychopathy (Rothemund et al., 2012), suggesting the crucial role of 
constructing accurate internal representations of emotional stimuli for mental health. Despite 
this evidence, the relation between emotional learning and subclinical difficulties in emotion 
processing, and in particular alexithymia, remains largely unexplored.  
However, it might be wondered whether alexithymia is also characterized by 
impairments in emotional learning and more broadly in constructing the accurate internal 
representation of emotional stimuli. Indeed, because accurate internal representation of 
emotional stimuli is crucial for recognition, response and response regulation to emotional 
stimuli and decision making (Bubic et al., 2010), investigating this aspect could provide new 
insight in the understanding of alexithymia and the mechanisms underlying its difficulties in 
emotion processing. In addition, given the relation between alexithymia and psychiatric 
disorders (Panaite & Bylsma, 2012), such investigation could also have clinical implications 
for the understanding of the relationship between this personality trait and the clinical 
conditions found to be associated with it.  
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Chapter 3. Describing alexithymia: difficulties in emotion perception, 
emotional intelligence, empathy and its impact on psychological wellbeing 
Introduction 
Alexithymia is a personality trait characterized by difficulty in identifying feelings, difficulty 
in describing them to others and a type of thinking focused more on concrete aspects 
regarding the external environment rather than on introspection on the internal mental life 
(Sifneos, 1973; Taylor et al., 1991). As reviewed in Chapter 1, alexithymia is related to a 
broad range of difficulties in processing emotional information, which have been described 
by previous research. In this chapter, two experiments will be presented that extend the 
current literature on the topic.  
Experiment 1 will show the impact of alexithymia on different aspects of the 
emotional life of individuals. Although some studies have previously investigated this issue, 
they have never examined a broad range of variables simultaneously in one sample of 
homogeneous demographic and socio-cultural background. Hence, limiting the conclusion 
that alexithymia can indeed have a widespread impact on individuals’ emotional life. To 
address this limitation, a series of questionnaires was completed by a group of participants to 
understand how alexithymia predicts difficulties in emotional intelligence, in empathic 
response to others’ emotions and on psychological wellbeing, focusing on anxiety and 
depression. 
Experiment 2 will focus on emotion perception and the identification of emotional 
facial expressions (EFEs), in particular. The previous literature has shown that alexithymia is 
related to the need for more time to accurately recognize intense EFEs (Grynberg et al., 2012) 
Nevertheless, in everyday life, EFEs are expressed at varying degree of intensity. For this 
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reason, it seems important to also investigate the impact of emotional intensity in the 
relationship between alexithymia and EFE identification. Indeed, alexithymia may be related 
to the need for more emotional intensity to accurately identify EFEs. 
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Experiment 1: Increasing alexithymia predicts decreasing emotional intelligence, 
empathy and psychological well being 
Introduction 
Previous research has found that alexithymia affects various aspects of the emotional life of 
individuals in the general population, from the ability to manipulate emotional information, to 
the response to others’ emotions, to individuals’ psychological wellbeing. Regarding the 
manipulation of emotional information, the correlation between alexithymia and emotional 
intelligence (EI) has been investigated. EI is defined as a set of cognitive abilities regarding 
emotion processing, namely the ability to perceive, understand, use and manage emotions in 
the self and others (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Previous 
studies found moderate negative correlation between alexithymia and emotional intelligence 
(EI) when using both self-report (Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 2005; Baughman et al., 2011; 
Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Möira Mikolajczak, Luminet, Leroy, & Roy, 2007; Moïra 
Mikolajczak, Luminet, & Menil, 2006; J. D. A. Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2001; Saklofske, 
Austin, & Minski, 2003; Webb & McMurran, 2008) and performance measures of EI (Curci, 
Lanciano, Soleti, Zammuner, & Salovey, 2013; Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, & Labouvie-
Vief, 2005), suggesting that increasing levels of alexithymia are related to decreasing EI. 
Regarding the effect of alexithymia on the response to others’ emotions, the relation 
between alexithymia and empathy can be explored, as being able to empathize with others is 
crucial to understand their feelings and respond to these appropriately (Decety, 2015). In fact, 
empathy can be conceptualized as an affective state equivalent to the affective state of 
another person and elicited by imagining or observing the other’s affective state, while being 
aware that our affective state is indeed elicited by the other person’s affective state 
(Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Singer & Lamm, 2009). Alexithymia has been found to be 
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negatively correlated to empathy (Grynberg et al., 2010; Patil & Silani, 2014b), with 
individuals with alexithymia exhibiting significantly lower scores on empathic concern and 
the ability to adopt the perspective of the other when compared to those without alexithymia, 
while having higher scores on the distress experienced during emotionally intense situations 
(Moriguchi et al., 2006, 2007). 
Finally, regarding the way in which alexithymia affects psychological wellbeing, two 
aspects that have been investigated are depression and anxiety. In particular, previous 
research has found a positive correlation of alexithymia both with depression (Honkalampi et 
al., 2000; S. Li et al., 2015; Lipsanen, Saarijärvi, & Lauerma, 2004; Mattila, Salminen, 
Nummi, & Joukamaa, 2006) and anxiety (Berthoz et al., 1999; Marchesi et al., 2000), 
indicating that as alexithymia increases psychological wellbeing decreases.  
One limitation of this literature is that the effect of alexithymia on these different 
aspects of emotion processing has been investigated in separate populations that differed on 
demographic and socio-cultural aspects, limiting the conclusion that alexithymia can indeed 
have a widespread impact on individuals’ emotional life. In addition, previous studies have 
not consistently looked at the contribution of the three different factors of alexithymia in 
predicting the emotion processing difficulties. For these reasons, the aim of the current 
experiment was to investigate the effect of alexithymia and its three underlying factors (i.e. 
difficulty in identifying feelings, difficulty in describing feelings, externally oriented 
thinking) in predicting EI, empathy, depression and anxiety, in a single sample of young 
individuals. Based on previous literature, increasing alexithymia was hypothesized to predict 
decreasing EI, empathy, while increasing depression and anxiety. 
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Methods 
Participants and procedure 
A total of 137 participants were recruited for the study. Before completion of the 
study, participants were informed about the procedure and asked to complete a battery of 
questionnaires. Five participants were excluded from analysis because they reported having 
psychiatric or neurological conditions. The final sample included 132 participants (37 males, 
age: M=23.79, SD=.18 years). 
All participants had equivalent educational background and were students at the 
University of Bologna and gave informed consent to participation. The study was designed 
and conducted in accordance with the ethical principles of the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional guidelines of the University of Bologna and was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology. 
Independent measure 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994). It is one of the most 
commonly used measures of alexithymia. It is a self-report scale, which comprises 20 items 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale 
provides a total score for general alexithymia, which results from the sum of the scores 
obtained on each question. It also has three subscales: difficulty describing feelings, difficulty 
identifying feelings and externally-oriented thinking, which measures the tendency of 
individuals to focus on external events rather than their internal world. It also provides cut-off 
scoring: total ≤ 51 indicates non-alexithymia, total ≥ 61 indicates alexithymia, 51 < total < 61 
indicates possible alexithymia. 
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Dependent measures 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, 
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Developed from an intelligence-testing tradition, it is the only 
available ability-based performance test to measure EI. The test requires participants to solve 
various emotional tasks and problems and includes 141 items, divided among 8 tasks. These 
are grouped by two, in order to measure the four abilities of EI: Perceiving Emotions refers to 
the ability to perceive emotions in oneself and others as well as in objects, art, stories, music; 
Using Emotions is the ability to generate, use, and feel emotion as necessary to communicate 
feelings or employ them in other cognitive processes; Understanding Emotions refers to the 
ability to understand emotional information, to understand how emotions combine and 
progress through relationship transitions, and to appreciate such emotional meanings; 
Managing Emotions is the ability to be open to feelings and modulate them in oneself and 
others to promote personal understanding and growth. So, the test provides a total score and 
four abilities scores. Standard score based on expert scoring (M=100, SD=15) was calculated 
for each participant.  
Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (Schutte et al., 1998). Based in 
the ability model of EI by Salovey and Mayer (1990), it is a self-report questionnaire, which 
includes 33-items to be answered on a 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) point Likert 
scale. The questionnaire provides a total score for general EI resulting from the sum of the 
score obtained on each question, with higher score indicating greater emotional intelligence. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). It is a self-report questionnaire 
to measure empathy consisting of 28-items answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well). The measure does not provide a 
total score but has 4 subscales, each made up of 7 different items, and the total score on each 
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subscales results from the sum of the score obtained on each question. Two subscales refer to 
the cognitive dimension of empathy, namely perspective taking assesses the tendency to 
spontaneously adopt the point of view of others and fantasy assesses the tendency to 
transpose imaginatively into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters in books, movies 
and plays. The other two subscales refer to the emotional dimension of empathy, namely 
empathic concern assesses “other-oriented” feelings of sympathy and concern and personal 
distress assesses "self-oriented" feelings of personal anxiety and unease during tense 
interpersonal settings. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). It is a self-report questionnaire including twenty-one questions assessing symptoms of 
depression, in addition to a question regarding eating habits, which is not included in the total 
score. Each question has four possible answers of increasing symptom intensity ranging from 
0 to 3. Participants answer questions choosing one of the options, considering the way they 
felt in the previous couple of weeks. The total score results from summing the score obtained 
on each question and indicates the severity of symptoms: below 4 indicates possible negation 
of depression, 5-9 minimal depression, 10-18 mild depression, 19-29 moderate depression, 
30-63 severe depression. 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983). The trait portion of form Y of the STAI was used to assess symptoms of trait 
anxiety. This is a self-report questionnaire, which comprises 20 items rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale ranging from ‘Almost never’ to ‘Almost always’. The total score results from the 
sum of the score obtained on each question and indicates the severity of symptoms, with 
higher score indicating greater anxiety. 
Statistical analyses 
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 A series of linear regressions and multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to 
investigate how alexithymia predicted scoring on the dependent measures. First, total scores 
were used. Then, following statistically significant results, the subscales of the measures were 
used to better understand the scales that contributed to the observed effects. To reduce the 
possibility of type 1 error due to multiple comparisons, Bonferroni corrected p-level was 
considered as significance threshold (i.e. p=.005). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. Note that, on average, the 
sample fell in the ‘non-alexithymia’ classification, had minimal/mild symptoms of 
depression, and average EI level. Also, only 127 participants completed the IRI, so the 
analyses on this measure will include only those participants. 
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Table 1 Descriptive data 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale 132 44.06 12.95 22.00 73.00 
Difficulty in describing feelings 132 12.92 4.96 5.00 24.00 
Difficulty in identifying feelings 132 15.19 5.94 7.00 34.00 
Externally oriented thinking 132 15.95 4.43 8.00 28.00 
Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 132 99.53 11.50 66.90 136.59 
Perceiving Emotions 132 113.67 15.32 81.47 145.88 
Using Emotions 132 97.38 14.04 69.27 129.70 
Understanding Emotions 132 95.49 10.45 69.96 122.14 
Managing Emotions 132 92.01 11.14 67.76 124.18 
Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test 132 122.74 15.32 81.00 157.00 
Interpersonal reactivity index      
Fantasy 127 17.71 5.09 5.00 28.00 
Personal distress 127 11.92 4.85 3.00 27.00 
Empathic concern 127 18.83 3.79 8.00 28.00 
Perspective taking 127 18.64 4.44 7.00 28.00 
Beck depression inventory 132 9.42 6.18 1.00 42.00 
Trait Anxiety (State Trait  Anxiety Inventory) 132 43.50 9.70 23.00 69.00 
 
Alexithymia negatively predicts emotional intelligence 
Performance EI. A simple linear regression showed that alexithymia was a significant 
predictor of performance EI (R
2
=.31, F(1,130)=13.62, p=.000) and that performance EI 
decreased with increasing alexithymia (unstandardised β=-.27, t(131)=-3.69, p=.000). 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was then conducted to investigate which of 
the alexithymia subscales predicted performance EI. Although the overall model with the 
three alexithymia subscales was significant in predicting performance EI (F(4, 125)=5.79, 
p=.000, partial η2 = .16; all other ps≥.036), only of externally oriented thinking made a 
significant contribution to the model (F(1, 125) =21.05, p=.000, partial η2 = .14; all other 
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ps≥.022). The ability to manage emotions decreased with increasing externally oriented 
thinking (unstandardised β =-1.09). 
Self-reported EI. A simple linear regression showed that alexithymia was a significant 
predictor of self-reported EI (R
2
=.43, F(1,130)=100.18, p=.000) and that self-reported EI 
decreased with increasing alexithymia (unstandardised β=-.66, t(131)=-10.01, p=.000). 
A multiple linear regression was then conducted to investigate which of the alexithymia 
subscales predicted self-reported EI. Although the overall model with the three alexithymia 
subscales was significant in predicting self-reported EI (R
2
=.70, F(3,128)=41.00, p=.000), 
only the difficulty in identifying feelings and externally oriented thinking subscales made a 
significant contribution to the model (DIF: unstandardised β=-.86, t(131)=-3.44, p=.001; 
EOT: unstandardised β=-1.66, t(131)=-6.54, p=.000). Self-reported EI decreased with 
increasing difficulty in identifying feelings and externally oriented thinking. 
Alexithymia negatively predicts empathy 
A MANOVA was conducted with the total alexithymia score predicting the four 
empathy scales. Results showed a significant effect of alexithymia on empathy (F(4, 
125)=13.56, p=.000, partial η2 = .31). Specifically, alexithymia predicted perspective taking 
(F(1, 125) = 23.69, p=.000, partial η2 = .16) and personal distress (F(1, 125) =20.57, p=.000, 
partial η2 = .14) but neither fantasy (F(1, 125)=3.96, p=.049, partial η2 = .03) nor empathic 
concern (F(1, 125) = 3.74, p = .055, partial η2 = .03). In addition, perspective taking 
decreased with increasing alexithymia (β = -.14), while personal distress increased with 
increasing alexithymia (β = .14). 
The MANOVA with the three alexithymia subscales as predictors of perspective 
taking and personal distress showed a significant effect only of difficulties in identifying 
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feelings and externally oriented thinking on the two empathy subscales (DIF: F(2, 122)=9.18, 
p=.000, partial η2 = .13; EOT: F(2, 122)=6.77, p=.002, partial η2 = .10). Specifically, 
difficulties in identifying feelings predicted personal distress (F(1, 123) =9.80, p=.002, partial 
η2 = .07), while externally oriented thinking predicted perspective taking (F(1, 123) = 13.29, 
p=.000, partial η2 = .10). Personal distress increased with increasing difficulties in identifying 
feelings (β = .32), while perspective taking decreased with increasing externally oriented 
thinking (β = -.34).  
Alexithymia positively predicts depression 
A simple linear regression showed that alexithymia was a significant predictor of 
symptoms of depression (R
2
=.15, F(1,130)=23.39, p=.000) and that symptoms of depression 
increased with increasing levels of alexithymia (unstandardised β=.19, t(131)=4.84, p=.000). 
A multiple linear regression was then conducted to investigate which of the 
alexithymia subscales predicted depression. Although the overall model with the three 
alexithymia subscales was significant in predicting depression (R
2
=.17, F(3,128)=8.88, 
p=.000), only the difficulty in identifying feelings subscale made a significant contribution to 
the model (unstandardised β=.40, t(131)=3.12, p=.002). Symptoms of depression increased 
with increasing difficulty in identifying feelings. 
Alexithymia positively predicts trait anxiety 
A simple linear regression showed that alexithymia was a significant predictor of trait 
anxiety (R
2
=.27, F(1,130)=47.87, p=.000) and that trait anxiety increased with increasing 
alexithymia (unstandardised β=.39, t(131)=6.92, p=.000). 
A multiple linear regression was then conducted to investigate which of the 
alexithymia subscales predicted anxiety. Although the overall model with the three 
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alexithymia subscales was significant in predicting anxiety (R
2
=.55, F(3,128)=18.72, 
p=.000), only the difficulty in identifying feelings subscale made a significant contribution to 
the model (unstandardised β=.77, t(131)=4.20, p=.000). Trait anxiety increased with 
increasing difficulty in identifying feelings. 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of alexithymia in predicting 
symptoms of emotional intelligence (EI), empathy, depression and anxiety in a group of 
young individuals. The data revealed that alexithymia predicted all these constructs. In 
particular, increasing levels of alexithymia were related to decreasing EI and empathy, while 
increasing depression and anxiety. In addition, different aspects of alexithymia were 
differentially related to these dependent measures. Specifically, increasing difficulty in 
identifying feelings was related to decreasing self-reported EI, increasing personal distress 
during emotionally intense situations, as measured on an empathy scale, as well as increasing 
depression and anxiety. Also, increasing externally oriented thinking was related to 
decreasing ability to manage emotions, as measured on a performance measure of EI, self-
reported EI and decreasing ability to adopt the point of view of another person, as measured 
on an empathy scale. Instead, difficulty in describing feelings did not appear to predict any of 
the dependent measures, suggesting that the ability to correctly identify and introspect on the 
emotions a person is feeling may play a more significant role than the ability to verbally 
discuss these emotions with somebody else, in predicting the capacity to manipulate 
emotional information, manage emotional experience and respond to other people’s 
emotional experiences, in addition to individual psychological wellbeing. 
Extending the previous literature that used measures of trait EI (Baughman et al., 
2011; J. D. A. Parker et al., 2001; Saklofske et al., 2003; Webb & McMurran, 2008), 
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increasing alexithymia predicted decreasing self-reported ability EI, corroborating Grieve and 
Mahar (2010) and deepening their results, showing that difficulty in identifying feelings and 
externally oriented thinking are the factors that affect self-reported EI. In addition, of 
particular significance is the result on the negative relationship between alexithymia and 
performance EI. The only two existing studies on the topic corroborate the main finding that 
alexithymia is also negatively related to performance EI (Curci et al., 2013; Lumley et al., 
2005), suggesting that as individuals report having increasing difficulties in identifying and 
describing emotions, they indeed show worse performance in tasks involving emotional 
information. When looking at the different subscales, only externally oriented thinking 
predicted difficulty in managing emotions, which indicates that lack of introspection may 
render more challenging to effectively manage emotional situations. This is in contrast to the 
previous studies, which found that all subscales of alexithymia predicted scoring on the 
different EI branches (Lumley et al., 2005) or that difficulty in identifying and describing 
feelings predicted difficulty in perception and understanding of emotions (Curci et al., 2013). 
These differences may in part result from the lack of correction for multiple comparisons, 
which may have inflated the possibility of type I error in previous studies, and in part result 
from methodological differences, such as demographics of the participants. Additional 
research should be conducted to clarify how the different factors of alexithymia affect the 
different EI abilities. 
The relationship between alexithymia and empathy was mostly in line with previous 
literature (Grynberg et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2006, 2007; Patil & Silani, 2014b). Indeed, 
alexithymia negatively predicted the tendency to adopt the point of view of the other, while 
positively predicted the distress elicited by the perception of others’ distress. In addition, no 
relationship was found between alexithymia and the tendency to transpose imaginatively into 
the feelings and actions of fictitious characters in books, movies and plays. Contrary to the 
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previous literature, no relationship between alexithymia and empathic concern was found. 
This may have resulted by the fact that here all the variables were simultaneously analyzed in 
one statistical model, which reduces the possibility of type I error that may have occurred in 
previous studies, which used separate analyses to test the relationship between alexithymia 
and each aspect of empathy. Focusing on the alexithymia subscales, difficulty in identifying 
feelings was positively related to personal distress during emotionally intense situations, 
while externally oriented thinking was negatively related to the ability to adopt the point of 
view of another person. This result suggests a coherent relationship between the cognitive 
and emotional aspects of each construct, with an emotional aspect of alexithymia impacting 
an emotional component of empathy, while a cognitive aspect of alexithymia impacting a 
cognitive component of empathy, in line with Grynberg et al. (2010).  
The positive correlation between alexithymia and depression and the relation between 
difficulty in identifying feelings and depression are in line with the previous literature 
(Berthoz et al., 1999; S. Li et al., 2015; Marchesi et al., 2000). However, a recent meta-
analysis also highlighted, respectively, moderate and a weak correlations between difficulty 
in describing feelings and externally oriented thinking and depression (S. Li et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, it also points out that the relationship between these two factors and depression 
seems less consistent, suggesting they may have a more marginal role in the relationship 
between alexithymia and depression than the difficulty in identifying feelings, as suggested 
by the present results. 
The result that alexithymia, and specifically difficulty in identifying feelings, 
positively predicted anxiety is also in line with the only three studies that investigated the 
relation between alexithymia and anxiety in the general population (Berthoz et al., 1999; 
Grynberg et al., 2010; Marchesi et al., 2000), replicating the results of Grynberg et al. (2010) 
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and extending the results of Berthoz et al., (1999), whose sample comprised only women and 
used an older version of the TAS, and the results of Marchesi et al. (2000), who had recruited 
their sample from individuals admitted to the emergency room, representing a possible 
confounding factor to the generalisability of results. 
To conclude, the current experiment shows that alexithymia can affect different 
domains of emotion processing, from the ability to manipulate emotional information, to the 
response to others’ emotions, to individuals’ psychological wellbeing. These results also 
highlight the importance of the study of alexithymia, which can have a significant impact on 
individuals’ emotional life, despite being a subclinical trait. 
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Experiment 2: individuals with alexithymia require higher emotional intensity to 
recognize fearful facial expressions 
Introduction 
Previous research found alexithymia to be related to worse performance in the identification 
of emotional facial expressions (EFEs) (Jessimer & Markham, 1997; Lane et al., 1996). 
Specifically, under temporal constraints alexithymia has been related to lower accuracy in 
EFE recognition (Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, 
Kersting, Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; Swart et al., 2009), which seems to be overcome 
when stimulus exposure time is extended (Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, 
Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, & Suslow, 2014; Pandey & Mandal, 1997; P. 
D. Parker et al., 2005). This suggests that alexithymia is associated to the need for more time 
to accurately recognize EFEs (Grynberg et al., 2012). 
Despite this evidence, previous research has focused on the response to intense EFEs. 
Nevertheless, these are rarely encountered in everyday life, where individuals are faced with 
the challenge of identifying emotional expression displayed at varying degrees of intensity. In 
fact, alexithymia may be hypothesized to be related not only to the need for more time but 
also for more perceptual information to identify EFEs. Therefore, manipulating the intensity 
of EFEs could offer the opportunity to extend current literature on the impact of alexithymia 
on EFE identification.  
In this regard, two studies exist that have used morphed faces to understand the role of 
emotional intensity in the relationship between alexithymia and EFE identification. 
Nevertheless, they present contrasting findings and have the limitation of focusing mainly on 
alexithymia within the autistic population. Specifically, the first study found alexithymia to 
be related to less precision, expressed as higher attribution threshold, in the identification of 
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morphed EFEs both in the autistic and control group (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). On 
the contrary, the second study found alexithymia to be related to reduced accuracy in 
identifying EFEs at low emotional intensity in the autistic but not the control group 
(Ketelaars, In’t Velt, Mol, Swaab, & van Rijn, 2016), raising the possibility that autism per se 
may represent a confounding factor contributing to the results. Therefore, it appears that 
further research is needed in order to understand the role of emotional intensity in the 
relationship between alexithymia and EFE identification.  
The aim of the present study was to investigate the impact of emotional intensity in 
the relationship between alexithymia and EFE identification. To this end, participants with 
low (LA) and high (HA) levels of alexithymia were tested in their ability to identify static 
morphed EFEs, which ranged from neutral to intense emotional expression. Individuals with 
high, as compared to low, levels of alexithymia were hypothesized to require more emotional 
intensity to be as efficient as LA in identifying the presence of the emotion in the face, hence 
showing decreased performance in this task. 
Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred university students completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
20; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003). Depending on the score, students were classified as LA 
(TAS-20 ≤ 36) or HA (TAS-20 ≥ 61) (Franz, Schaefer, Schneider, Sitte, & Bachor, 2004) and 
were then randomly contacted to participate in the study. Once in the laboratory, the 
alexithymia module of the structured interview for the Diagnostic Criteria for Psychosomatic 
Research (DCPR; Mangelli, Semprini, Sirri, Fava, & Sonino, 2006) was administered to 
increase reliability of screening and confirm TAS-20 classification. This measure has 6 
questions to evaluate presence or absence of alexithymic characteristics. At least 3 
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characteristics are required for a classification of alexithymia. Participants with discordant 
classification on the two measures did not complete the task (n = 1). Due to the high co-
occurrence of alexithymia and depression (S. Li et al., 2015), participants completed the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) and did not complete the experimental task in case 
their score was higher than the moderate depression cut-off (i.e. 19, n = 1).  
Forty volunteers with no history of major medical, neurological or psychiatric 
disorders completed the study: 20 LA (6 males; TAS-20 M = 30.25, SD = 4.12; age M = 
24.55, SD = 2.98 years); 20 HA (6 males; TAS-20 M = 63.37, SD = 2.25; age M = 23.03, SD 
= 2.32 years). A priori targets for sample size and data collection stopping rule were based on 
sample and effect sizes reported in the literature on alexithymia and EFE identification 
(sample size of an average of 38 participants in total as indicated in a recent review 
(Grynberg et al., 2012)). 
All participants had equivalent educational backgrounds and were students at the 
University of Bologna. The study was designed and conducted in accordance with the ethical 
principles of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional 
guidelines of the University of Bologna and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
Department of Psychology. All participants gave informed written consent to participation 
after being informed about the procedure of the study. 
Independent measure 
Stimuli consisted of black and white photographs of 20 actors (10 males) with each actor 
depicting 3 EFEs, respectively of happiness, disgust and fear. Half of the pictures were taken 
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) 
and half from the Pictures of Facial Affect database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Pictures were 
trimmed to fit an ellipse in order to uniform them and remove distracting features from the 
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face, such as hair or ears and non-facial contours. Each emotional facial expression was then 
morphed with the neutral facial expression of the corresponding identity using Abrosoft 
FantaMorph, (2009) in order to create stimuli of 20% increments of emotional intensity 
ranging from 0% to 100% emotional intensity. This resulted in a total of 360 stimuli 
(20x13cm size), i.e. 20 actors expressing 3 emotions with 6 degrees of intensity (0%, 20%, 
40%, 60%, 80%, 100%; Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of morphed pictures of fearful facial expressions used as EFEs ranging from 0% to 100% 
emotional intensity. 
 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross (500ms) in the centre of the 
screen followed by the stimulus (100ms) and subsequently a black screen (3000ms) during 
which participants could provide the answer by pressing one of four keys with their index and 
middle finger of either hand. Keys were labeled “N” for neutral (i.e. Italian = “neutro”), “F” 
for happiness (i.e. Italian = “felicità”), “P” for fear (i.e. Italian = “paura”) and “D” for disgust 
(i.e. Italian = “disgusto”). The experiment consisted of 360 randomized trials divided in two 
blocks of 180 trials so that participants could rest if desired. The order of keys was 
counterbalanced between participants. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of experimental trial. The stimulus is represented by a fearful face, as an example. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a sound attenuated room with dimmed light. Participants sat in 
a relaxed position on a comfortable chair in front of a computer monitor (17’’, 60Hz refresh 
rate) used for stimuli presentation at 57cm distance. Participants were instructed that at each 
trial a face would briefly appear on the screen and their task would be to identify the emotion 
expressed by the face by pressing one of four keys. Before beginning the task, participants 
familiarized with the position of keys by having the experimenter calling out loud in random 
order the keys and participants pressing them until they felt confident they could press them 
correctly while fixating the screen.  
Dependent measure 
For each emotional facial expression, the expression identification rate at each intensity level 
was computed. Then, for each subject, expression identification rates for each emotional 
facial expression were fit to a psychometric function using a generalized linear model with a 
binomial distribution in MATLAB software  (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) (Nakajima, 
Minami, & Nakauchi, 2017). The point of subjective equality (PSE) was then calculated and 
41 
 
used for statistical analysis. This represented the percentage of emotional intensity at which 
subjects had equal probability to identify the facial expression as neutral or emotional.  
 
Figure 3. Average psychometric function for each emotional expression as a function of group. The dots represent the point 
of subjective equivalence (PSE). 
 
Results 
A 3x2 repeated measures analysis of variance (emotion:  happiness, disgust, fear; 
group:  low alexithymia, high alexithymia) on PSE scores showed a significant group by 
emotion interaction (F(2,76)=4.69, p=0.012, partial η2 = 0.11). Bonferroni post-hoc test 
shows that HA had higher PSE compared to LA only for the fearful emotional facial 
expression (p=0.004; MHA=54.05, MLA=43.71). Therefore, HA need more emotional intensity 
to identify fearful facial expressions compared to LA.  
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Figure 4. Mean point of subjective equivalence (PSE) for each emotional facial expression as a function of group. 
Participants with high alexithymia have higher PSE than those with low alexithymia for the fearful facial expression, 
indicating they need more emotional intensity to identify fearful facial expressions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Significant differences are indicated as follows: **p< .01. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of alexithymia in processing 
EFEs. Specifically, alexithymia was hypothesized to be related to the need for more 
emotional intensity to identify static morphed EFEs ranging from neutral to intense emotional 
expression. Results showed that HA had higher point of subjective equivalence than LA 
when identifying fearful EFE, indicating the need of more emotional intensity to identify the 
presence of that expression in the face. Crucially, while previous studies showed that HA 
need more time to identify EFEs as efficiently as LA (Grynberg et al., 2012), the present 
study extends the current literature suggesting that HA also need more perceptual 
information, specifically to identify fearful EFEs. 
The difficulty in processing fearful EFE is in line with previous literature. Indeed, 
compared to LA, HA rate the expression of fearful, but not other EFEs, as less intense 
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(Prkachin, Casey, & Prkachin, 2009), they fail to show enhanced remapping of fear on their 
own somatosensory system (Scarpazza et al., 2014, 2015) and enhanced electrophysiological 
response when encoding fearful body postures (Borhani et al., 2016). These results have been 
interpreted in light of the decreased activation of the amygdala observed in alexithymia in 
response to the presentation of EFEs (Jongen et al., 2014; Kugel et al., 2008), negative 
emotional stimuli (Moriguchi & Komaki, 2013; van der Velde et al., 2013; Wingbermühle et 
al., 2012) and in particular fearful ones (Pouga et al., 2010). Although involved in processing 
EFEs in general (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009), the amygdala appears a crucial structure in 
processing fearful EFEs. Indeed, lesion of this structure has been found to impair the 
recognition of fearful EFEs (Adolphs et al., 1999, 1994). Furthermore, in addition to 
processing fear, the amygdala appears to have a role in processing emotional intensity. The 
increase of emotional intensity enhances amygdala activation, as shown by increased 
amygdala response during the presentation of high as compared to low intensity EFEs 
(Winston, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Therefore, it is possible that a reduced response in the 
amygdala in HA may underlie the present results. 
In contrast to the difference found in response to fearful EFEs, no difference between 
the groups was found when identifying happy or disgusted facial expressions. In this regard, 
previous behavioral studies have reported mixed results. Alexithymia was either related to a 
global deficit to recognize EFEs, including happiness and disgust (Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, 
Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; 
Jessimer & Markham, 1997), or, in line with the current results, the difficulty of alexithymia 
was limited to the identification of EFEs other than happiness and disgust (Ihme, Sacher, 
Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, & Suslow, 
2014; Prkachin et al., 2009). In addition, with regards to happiness, the majority of 
neuroimaging studies failed to report a relationship between alexithymia and differences in 
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brain activity in response to happy EFEs (Duan, Dai, Gong, & Chen, 2010; Eichmann, Kugel, 
& Suslow, 2008; Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, 
Kersting, Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, 
Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, & Suslow, 2014, 2014; Kugel et al., 2008; but 
see Reker et al., 2010 for contrasting results). Regarding disgusted EFEs instead, no 
neuroimaging studies on alexithymia and EFEs recognition could be found that included such 
facial expression among their stimuli, leaving this issue open for future research. 
Being this the first study to investigate the impact of emotional intensity in the 
relationship between alexithymia and EFE identification on healthy participants, it is crucial 
to point its limitation in order to guide future research. To limit the duration of the task, not 
all basic emotions were included among the stimuli, restricting the implications of the results. 
Therefore, future studies should investigate response also to the emotions not included here. 
Also, the time of stimuli presentation was quite limited (100ms), because previous studies 
showed that exposure time plays a significant role in the ability of HA to identify EFEs 
(Grynberg et al., 2012), future studies could investigate whether time plays a role also in the 
current results. Exposure time could be extended to clarify whether the difficulty in the 
identification of fear would remain or not when this is increased. 
To conclude, the present study shows that alexithymia requires more perceptual 
information to identify fearful EFEs, possibly suggesting insufficient amygdala activation in 
response to these stimuli to enable efficient recognition of such emotional expression.  
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Conclusion 
The experiments presented in this chapter contribute to the literature describing the 
difficulties of individuals with alexithymia in processing emotional information. Specifically, 
Experiment 1 shows that alexithymia has a widespread effect on the emotional life of 
individuals being related to decreasing emotional intelligence, empathy and psychological 
wellbeing, highlighting the importance of studying this personality trait. In addition, 
Experiment 2 shows that alexithymia is related to the need for more emotional intensity to 
identify fear in emotional facial expressions, extending the previous literature that had shown 
alexithymia is related to the need for more time to identify emotions in facial expressions. 
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Chapter 4. Understanding alexithymia: impairments in emotional learning 
Introduction  
Although the literature has dedicated extensive research to describe the difficulties in emotion 
processing related to alexithymia, significantly less studies have been dedicated to the 
understanding of the basic mechanisms that may underlie such difficulties. Nevertheless, this 
type of investigation could provide new insight in the understanding and conceptualization of 
this personality trait.  
Although in our daily life countless stimuli can elicit an emotional response, only a 
restricted range of stimuli is biologically programmed to do so, which includes appetitive and 
aversive unconditioned stimuli (LeDoux, 1998). However, to increase the chances of 
survival, we usually expand the range of emotional stimuli, from those that unconditionally 
trigger an emotional response to those that are often associated with them, thanks to a process 
called associative emotional learning. In associative emotional learning a neutral stimulus or 
behavior and an unconditioned stimulus are repeatedly associated. As a consequence, the 
emotional response that is first triggered by the unconditioned stimulus is transferred on the 
neutral stimulus or behavior (e.g. Seymour et al., 2004), which acquires emotional value 
becoming predictor of the unconditioned stimulus. As such, these internal representations are 
used to predict coming emotional stimuli, preparing the organism to respond to the predicted 
emotional stimuli (McNally & Westbrook, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Nevertheless, for 
such mechanism to be adaptive, these predictions need to be precise. To ensure this, every 
time an emotional stimulus is predicted, this prediction is compared against the incoming 
information and if there is a discrepancy between the two, a prediction error is computed to 
change the erroneous prediction driving learning (Friston, 2010). Therefore, precise 
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computation of predictions and prediction errors are necessary for successful emotional 
learning and ultimately accurate construction of emotions. 
 Given this premise, Chapter 2 raised the question that the difficulties in emotion 
processing of alexithymia could be a manifestation of an underlying impairment in emotional 
learning. In order to test this question, four experiments will be presented in the following 
chapter. Experiment 3 and 4 will examine the way in which alexithymia impacts the 
construction of emotional predictions, assessing the psychophysiological correlates of 
emotional predictions during Pavlovian aversive and appetitive conditioning respectively. 
Experiment 5 will not only examine the impact of alexithymia on emotional predictions but 
also prediction errors, which are equally crucial to construct accurate internal representations 
of emotional stimuli. In particular, it will assess the electrophysiological correlates of 
prediction and prediction error during appetitive conditioning. In all experiments, alexithymia 
is hypothesized to be related to decreased ability to compute predictions and prediction errors 
during emotional learning. Finally, Experiment 6 will examine how alexithymia affects 
behavior both during learning as well as after learning, when the information learned has to 
be used in a new context to make effective decisions, here focusing on instrumental rather 
than Pavlovian learning. In this case, alexithymia is hypothesized to be related to a difficulty 
in learning from rewards and punishments and a difficulty in then using such learning 
effectively to drive behavior in a new context. 
  
48 
 
Experiment 3: reduced psychophysiological correlates of prediction of aversive 
stimuli during threat conditioning in alexithymia 
Introduction 
Pavlovian threat conditioning is a crucial adaptive mechanism that enables the 
individual to learn to predict the occurrence of aversive events in order to efficiently avoid 
them (Maren, 2001). In pavlovian threat conditioning, a neutral stimulus is paired with an 
aversive unconditioned stimulus (UCS), which elicits innate emotional responses, named 
unconditioned response (UR). After repeated pairing of the two stimuli, the individual learns 
to predict the occurrence of UCS at the presentation of the neutral stimulus, which becomes a 
conditioned stimulus (CS). In the end, the sole presentation of CS elicits an anticipatory 
response in preparation to the occurrence of UCS, called conditioned response (CR). Both 
UR and CR are marked by physiological changes in autonomic nervous system activity, such 
as increased skin conductance response (SCR) (LeDoux, 2014; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). 
Higher SCR, in response to CS, signals increased expectations regarding the occurrence of 
UCS following the presentation of CS, indicating that the association between CS and UCS  
has been learnt (S. S. Y. Li & McNally, 2014). Additionally, changes in subjective affective 
experience accompany the physiological changes and higher arousal and lower pleasantness 
are generally reported by participants at the presentation of CS compared to a neutral 
stimulus (Tabbert et al., 2011). 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the differences between LA, HA and 
individuals with medium levels of alexithymia (MA) in learning to predict an aversive 
emotional event during pavlovian threat conditioning. Sixty HA, LA and MA, as measured 
by the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20)(Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003), 
completed a classical threat conditioning task with partial reinforcement (Garofalo et al., 
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2014; Schiller, Levy, Niv, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008). On each trial, one of two colored 
squares was presented.  During habituation none of the stimuli was reinforced to ensure there 
were no baseline differences in response to the stimuli. During acquisition one stimulus was 
reinforced with a mild electric stimulation (UCS) on 80% of trials (CS+) while the other was 
never reinforced (CS-). During extinction no stimulation was administered. Changes in SCR 
were recorded continuously during the experiment as a psychophysiological indicator of the 
degree of prediction of the UCS. In addition, to assess subjective experience, participants 
reported the level of anxiety and fear experienced at the presentation of each CS. HA were 
hypothesized to have lower prediction of the aversive emotional event (i.e. UCS), exhibiting 
lower SCR in response to the CS+ compared to MA and LA, while no differences between 
MA and LA were expected. 
Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred university students completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20)(Taylor et al., 2003). Depending on the score, students were classified as LA (TAS-
20 ≤ 36), MA (36 < TAS-20 < 61) or HA (TAS-20 ≥ 61) (Franz et al., 2004). Individuals 
from the three groups were randomly contacted and asked to participate in the study. Due to 
the high co-occurrence of alexithymia and depression(S. Li et al., 2015), participants 
completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961), and were excluded from the in 
case their score was higher than the moderate depression cut-off (i.e. 19; n = 5). Sixty-two 
university students with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders completed the 
study. After the experimental task, explicit awareness of the contingency between CS and 
UCS was assessed. Two participants were removed from analysis due to failure in reporting 
the correct association between stimuli. The final sample included in the analysis consisted of 
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60 participants (22 males; age M = 24.03, SD = 2.38 years old) divided in three groups: 20 
LA (7 males; TAS-20 M = 30.42, SD = 3.79; age M = 24.67, SD = 2.83 years old); 20 MA (8 
males; TAS-20 M = 46.10, SD = 6.18; age M = 24.06, SD = 1.80 years old); 20 HA (7 males; 
TAS-20 M = 63.63, SD = 2.39; age M = 23.35, SD = 2.32). A priori targets for sample size 
and data collection stopping rule were based on sample and effect sizes reported in the 
literature on classical fear conditioning (sample size around 17-19 participants per group as 
indicated by a recent meta-analysis (Fullana et al., 2015)). 
Because anxiety is known to affect SCR in classical threat conditioning (Duits et al., 
2015), levels of anxiety were measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et 
al., 1983). Levels of anxiety in the three groups differed significantly both for state (F(2, 57) 
= 5.86, p = .005) and trait anxiety (F(2, 57) = 21.54, p < .001). Post-hoc Newman-Keuls test 
showed that for state anxiety LA (M = 33.84) had significantly lower levels of anxiety 
compared to MA (M = 40.22; p = .009) and HA (M = 39.79; p = .006), while for trait anxiety 
all groups differed significantly from each other, with LA (M = 36.42) showing lower levels 
of trait anxiety compared to MA (M = 44.32; p = .001) and HA (M = 51.53; p < .001) and 
MA showing lower levels of trait anxiety compared to HA (p = .003). Correlations between 
levels of anxiety and differential SCR response were explored to exclude an effect of anxiety 
on results. 
The study was designed and conducted in accordance with the ethical principles of the 
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional guidelines of the 
University of Bologna and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of 
Psychology. All participants gave informed written consent to participation after being 
informed about the procedure of the study. 
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Independent measure 
Pavlovian threat conditioning. The task consisted in a classical differential threat 
conditioning paradigm with partial reinforcement (Garofalo et al., 2014; Schiller et al., 2008). 
Two isoluminant colored squares represented the CS. The UCS consisted of a mild electric 
stimulation of 200ms in duration generated by a Digitimer Stimulator (Model DS7, Digitimer 
Ltd., UK) administered to the inner wrist of the right hand, to which two electrodes were 
attached. The intensity of the stimulation was set with a standard workup procedure. It was 
initially set at 0.5mA and increased of 1mA until participants reported it as being highly 
uncomfortable but not painful. 
Each trial consisted in the presentation of one CS in the centre of a computer screen 
(17’’, refresh rate 60Hz) for 6 seconds followed by an inter trial interval of 12 seconds during 
which a fixation cross was presented (Fig. 5). The task included 40 trials (20 for each CS) 
divided in three blocks: habituation, acquisition and extinction.  
At the beginning of habituation, instructions appeared on the screen stating that two 
different images would be presented one at the time in the centre of the screen, no stimulation 
would be administered and the task of the participant would be to carefully observe the 
images. Habituation included 4 trials (2 for each CS) to ensure the absence of any baseline 
differences within and between groups in response to the images. At the beginning of 
acquisition, similar instructions stated that the same two images would appear one at the time 
in the centre of the screen and that one of them might be paired with the stimulation. The task 
of participants remained to carefully observe the images. No information was given about 
contingencies between images and stimulation. Acquisition included 16 trials (8 for each CS). 
CS+ was reinforced in 80% of the trials (n = 6), while CS- was never reinforced. Extinction 
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followed acquisition without any instructions. It included 20 trials (10 for each CS) and no 
stimulation was administered.  
 
Figure 5. Illustration of a CS- trial and a CS+ trial, in which the presentation of the CS+ was reinforced by the shock. 
 
Stimuli were presented in pseudo-randomized order, no more than two presentations 
of the same stimulus occurred in a row (Schiller et al., 2008). The first two trials of 
acquisition always included one CS- and one CS+ presented randomly. The color of the 
square associated to the CS+ and CS- was counterbalanced across participants. 
Dependent measures 
Skin conductance response recording and processing. The SCR was recorded through two 
Ag/AgCl electrodes (TSD203 Model; Biopac Systems, USA), filled with isotonic 
hyposaturated conductant attached to the distal phalanges of the second and third finger of 
participants’ left hand and held with Velcro straps. The SCR signal was continuously 
recorded at 200Hz and amplified using a DC amplifier (Biopac GSR100; Biopac Systems, 
USA) with 5µS/V gain factor and 10Hz low pass filter. The analogue signal was digitalized 
using the MP-150 digital converter (Biopac Systems, USA) and fed into AcqKnowledge 3.9 
software (Biopac Systems, USA). 
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SCR data were analyzed using MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., USA) custom-made 
scripts (Garofalo et al., 2014). SCR was calculated as the peak-to-peak amplitude difference 
of the largest deflection in the 0.5-4.5sec latency window after stimulus onset. Regarding 
SCR to UCS, stimulus onset was represented by the administration of shock, while regarding 
SCR to CS, stimulus onset referred to the time of CS appearance. The SCR was transformed 
into microsiemens (µS) and calculated for each trial. Minimum response criterion was 0.02µS 
and smaller responses were encoded as zero. Square root transformation was conducted on 
raw SCR to normalize the data distribution and SCR were scaled to each subject’s maximal 
UCS response to account for interindividual variability (Schiller et al., 2008).  
Both SCR to UCS and CS- were analyzed to ensure that groups did not differ in their 
physiological response to the stimulation or in the anticipatory response to CS- but only to a 
conditioned stimulus that predicts an aversive event (i.e. CS+). Regarding SCR to UCS, both 
peak response and average response were analyzed. For each participant, peak response 
represented the highest SCR in response to six shocks while mean response was the average 
of the SCRs to the six shocks. Regarding the response to CSs, SCRs during the three phases 
of conditioning were analyzed separately. Concerning habituation, all trials were included in 
the analysis. With regards to acquisition, the first two trials were not included in the analysis 
because participants learned the association between UCS and CS+ after its first pairing with 
the shock. Regarding extinction, all trials were included in the analysis but this phase was 
divided in two blocks (early and late extinction). Then, mean SCR of each participant was 
computed to produce four average scores representing the SCR of each subject during 
habituation, acquisition, early and late extinction. These were then averaged to obtain the 
SCR during the different phases for each alexithymia group. 
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Assessment of subjective anxiety, fear and contingency awareness. Participants were 
asked to report the level of anxiety and fear experienced at the presentation of each CS on 
separate visual analogue scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extreme). The order of 
questions was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were also asked to indicate which of the two stimuli was associated with 
the stimulation to ensure explicit awareness of pairing between CS+ and UCS. Participants 
who failed to report the correct association were removed from analysis. 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a sound attenuated room with dimmed light. 
Participants were seated in a chair in front of a computer monitor at ~70 cm distance. Once 
seated, the experimental procedure was explained and written informed consent was obtained 
from participants. Then SCR electrodes were attached and correct recording of the signal was 
ensured. Participants were then told the task consisted of two phases and that instructions 
would appear on the screen for each phase. Following completion of the task, subjective 
reports were completed. 
Results 
No difference in UCS intensity and peak and mean SCR to UCS among groups 
Univariate ANOVAs were used to evaluate differences in UCS intensity and mean 
and peak SCR to the UCS among groups. Results showed no significant differences among 
the three groups in either UCS intensity (F(2, 57) = 1.06, p = .353, partial η2 = .04), peak 
SCR in response to UCS (F(2, 57) = .31, p = .736, partial η2 = .01) or mean SCR in response 
to UCS (F(2, 57) = .80, p = .456; partial η2 = .03). On average, the intensity of the stimulation 
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received by participants and the physiological response to it did not differ significantly 
among groups. 
No difference in SCR among groups or stimuli during habituation 
A 3x2 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-) was carried out to 
analyze SCR during habituation. Analysis on SCR showed no significant main effect of 
group (F(2, 57) = .71, p = .494, partial η2 = .02), stimulus (F(1, 57) = .84, p = .361, partial η2 
= .01) or interaction (F(2, 57) = .38, p = .681, partial η2 = .01), confirming that at baseline 
there were neither within group nor between group differences in response to the two 
conditioned stimuli. 
SCR after habituation 
A 3x2x3 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-; phase: acquisition, 
early extinction, late extinction) was carried out to analyze SCR in the phases following 
habituation. Analysis on SCR showed significant stimulus by phase by group interaction 
(F(4,114) = 3.64, p = .008, partial η2 = .11). This interaction was further explored conducting 
separate ANOVAs for acquisition and extinction. 
Reduced SCR in anticipation of shock during acquisition in high alexithymia 
The 3x2 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-) on SCR during 
acquisition showed a significant main effect of group (F(2, 57) = 3.26, p = .046, partial η2 = 
0.10) and stimulus (F(1, 57) = 84.74, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.60). Crucially, this was 
secondary to a stimulus by group interaction (F(2, 57) = 3.26, p = .046, partial η2 = .10) was 
found, indicating that groups differed in SCR to the two conditioned stimuli. Newman-Keuls 
test showed that despite all groups showing significant difference in response to CS+ as 
compared to CS- (MLACS- = .12 µS, MLACS+ = .30 µS; p < .001; MMACS- = .16 µS, MMACS+ = 
.31 µS; p < .001; MHACS- = .09 µS, MHACS+ = .18 µS; p = .007), there was a significant 
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difference between groups in response to CS+. Specifically, HA had significantly lower SCR 
compared to LA (p = .007) and MA (p = .015). No difference was found in SCR to CS+ 
between LA and MA or in response to CS- among any of the groups (all p > .262; Fig. 6). 
Therefore, all groups showed differential increase in SCR to CS+ compared to CS-. 
However, SCR to CS+ exhibited by HA was significantly lower than SCR exhibited by the 
other two groups. On the contrary, responses to CS- were comparable among groups. 
Given that difference in SCR between CS+ and CS- may be influenced by the levels 
of anxiety, correlations between these two variables were explored to exclude a significant 
contribution of anxiety to the results. Neither trait nor state anxiety correlated significantly 
with difference in SCR to the two conditioned stimuli (all p > .292). 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean square rooted skin conductance response (SCR) to CS+ and CS- during acquisition as a function of 
alexithymia group. Although all groups show higher SCR to CS+ than CS-, participants with high alexithymia have show 
significantly less SCR to CS+ compared to those with medium and low alexithymia. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Significant differences are indicated as follows: *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p<.001. 
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Enhanced extinction in high alexithymia 
A 3x2x2 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-; phase: early 
extinction, late extinction) on SCR during extinction showed neither a significant main effect 
nor interaction of time with the other factors was found (all p > .183). A main effect of 
stimulus was present (F(1, 57) = 24.30, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.30), although secondary to the 
stimulus by group interaction. Crucially, there was a significant stimulus by group interaction 
(F(2, 57) = 5.53, p = .007, partial η2 = 0.16). Newman-Keuls test showed that LA and MA 
maintained a significantly higher SCR to CS+ compared to CS- (MLACS- = 0.10 µS, MLACS+ = 
0.15 µS; p = .037; MMACS- = 0.10 µS, MMACS+ = 0.24 µS; p < .001). On the contrary, HA 
extinguished the differential SCR response to the CSs (MHACS- = 0.07 µS, MHACS+ = 0.09 µS; 
p = .355; Fig. 7). 
Also in this phase neither trait nor state anxiety correlated significantly with the 
difference in SCR between CS+ and CS- (all p > .616). 
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Figure 7. Mean square rooted skin conductance response (SCR) to CS+ and CS- during extinction as a function of 
alexithymia group. While participants with low and medium alexithymia maintained higher SCR to CS+ than CS-, 
participants with high alexithymia extinguished the differential SCR once the CS+ was no more reinforced. Error bars 
represent standard errors. Significant differences are indicated as follows: *p< .05; **p< .01. 
 
No difference in subjective reports of anxiety and fear among groups 
3x2 RM ANOVAs (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-) were conducted on 
subjective reports of fear and anxiety experienced at the presentation of the conditioned 
stimuli. Both the subjective report on anxiety and fear showed a main effect of stimulus 
(respectively: F(1, 57) = 170.41, p < .001, partial η2 = .75; F(1, 57) = 133.34, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .70). The reported anxiety to CS+ (MCS+ = 59.84%) was higher than to CS- (MCS- = 
23.56%; p < .001) as well as the reported fear to CS+ (MCS+ = 46.13%) was higher than to 
CS- (MCS- = 13.41%; p < .001). In contrast, no significant main effect of group or interaction 
was found either for anxiety or fear (all ps≥.117).  
Discussion 
This experiment investigated whether HA presented reduced prediction of aversive 
emotional stimuli. To this end, changes in SCR and subjective emotional experience were 
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assessed during pavlovian threat conditioning to assess differences among LA, MA and HA 
in predicting the occurrence of a negative emotional event by learning patterns of association 
between CS+ and UCS. Participants correctly associated CS+ and UCS, suggesting that they 
explicitly identified the stimulus that anticipated the negative emotional event. In addition, 
groups did not differ in the intensity of UCS received, SCR to it and emotional experience 
reported in response to presentation of CS+. On the contrary, results showed significant 
differences among HA and MA and LA in SCR during acquisition that exacerbated during 
extinction.  
Specifically, during acquisition all three groups learned the anticipatory value of CS+ 
in predicting UCS, as indicated by higher SCR to CS+ compared to CS-. However, the 
degree of physiological response elicited by the anticipation of UCS in HA was lower 
compared to MA and LA, as shown by significantly lower SCR to CS+. This reduced 
response intensified during extinction, when the differential SCR to CS+ extinguished in HA 
while it was maintained in MA and LA. This suggested that the response elicited by the 
anticipation of UCS disappeared as soon as the predictive value of CS+ was no more 
reinforced by the administration of UCS. Crucially, this result did not appear to be dependent 
solely on the reduced SCR to CS+ during acquisition. These differences between the groups 
were attributable neither to differences in the intensity of UCS, because all groups received 
comparable intensities of stimulation, nor to reactivity to UCS itself, because groups did not 
differ in mean or peak SCR amplitude to UCS. In addition, groups did not differ in their SCR 
during habituation, acquisition or extinction to CS-, indicating comparable physiological 
response to neutral stimuli as well. Therefore, although HA seem to learn to differentiate a 
neutral from a conditioned stimulus, they appear less responsive in predicting the negative 
consequences of a conditioned stimulus compared to LA and MA. This becomes particularly 
evident once the conditioned stimulus ceased to be reinforced revealing a difficulty in 
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maintaining the prediction learned over time. As soon as the conditioned stimulus was no 
more reinforced by the aversive stimulus, the emotional value that HA had learnt to attribute 
to the conditioned stimulus disappeared. 
Physiological changes in the anticipation of negative emotional events have been 
proposed to be a crucial component of emotional experience (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 
2012) and they have the adaptive function of guiding attention towards the source of the 
events preparing the organism to effectively identify, respond and regulate the response to 
such event (LeDoux, 2014; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Therefore, the anticipation of 
emotional events might be crucial for effective emotion processing. Results suggest that HA 
are less able to predict the coming emotional event and possibly its consequences, which 
would be crucial to allow rapid identification, response and regulation of the response to such 
event. This difference may represent a shared underlying mechanism contributing to the 
difficulties of this group in emotion processing, which are particularly evident in ambiguous 
contexts, such as the recognition of emotional stimuli during limited time constraints, 
decision making in moral dilemmas and emotional response regulation (Grynberg et al., 
2012; Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, 
Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; Patil & Silani, 2014b; Pollatos & Gramann, 2012). 
Predicting the emotional future seems to involve more complex mechanisms than just 
learning about the contingency between CS+ and UCS (S. S. Y. Li & McNally, 2014). In 
fact, the individual is required to learn the causal relationship between the CS+ and UCS. At 
each learning trial, UCS acts as teaching signal strengthening the response to CS+. The 
strength of this teaching signal is modulated by predictions regarding the occurrence of UCS 
following the presentation of CS+ (McNally, Johansen, & Blair, 2011). A brain circuit seems 
to be responsible for such process involving the periaqueductal gray, relaying the UCS 
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teaching signal to the amygdala through indirect pathways via the thalamus, which then 
project to the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). Once in the amygdala, the UCS teaching signal then modulates 
plasticity at CS+ input synapses strengthening the response to CS+ (McNally et al., 2011). 
The amygdala then sends an output to the regions that regulate activity in the autonomic 
nervous system, to generate changes in SCR (Knight, Nguyen, & Bandettini, 2005; Olsson & 
Phelps, 2007; Pape & Pare, 2010). Indeed, previous research has shown decreased activation 
of mPFC, ACC and amygdala during processing of negative emotional stimuli in HA (Reker 
et al., 2010; van der Velde et al., 2014). Similarly, this circuit might be less active also during 
to the anticipation of negative emotional events. 
The lower physiological response in anticipation to UCS in HA was not reflected in 
lower subjective reports of fear and anxiety. HA reported comparable levels of anxiety and 
fear experienced at the presentation of CS+ to LA and MA. These data would support a 
decoupling between the subjective experience and physiological response to emotional 
stimuli in alexithymia (Eastabrook et al., 2013) and more broadly corroborate theories that 
argue for a distinction between processes generating the physiological response in threat 
conditioning and those that give rise to conscious feelings of fear and anxiety (LeDoux, 2014; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001). In fact, while the amygdala is crucial structure in generating SCR 
to CS+, cortical areas seem to be involved in attributing meaning to interoceptive inputs to 
construct the experience of an emotion (Lindquist et al., 2012). Such dissociation has been 
observed in a number of other conditions. For example, patients with lesions to the amygdala 
have shown diminished (LaBar et al., 1995) or absent (Bechara et al., 1995) SCR to an 
aversively conditioned stimulus, despite intact unconditioned response and awareness about 
the association between conditioned and unconditioned stimulus. On the contrary, patients 
with split brain (Làdavas et al., 1993), hemispatial neglect (Tamietto et al., 2015) and 
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affective blindsight (Bertini et al., 2013; Cecere et al., 2014; Tamietto et al., 2009) have 
shown intact physiological response in the absence of awareness for emotional stimuli. 
Nevertheless, although physiological responses and awareness for emotion can be separated, 
somatic and interoceptive information regarding one’s own body is generally incorporated 
with semantic and contextual knowledge to generate an integrated representation of  affective 
state (Barrett et al., 2007; Critchley et al., 2004) and this might be the case for LA and MA. 
However, in HA the physiological and cognitive aspect of emotional experience may remain 
decoupled possibly contributing to their difficulties. Despite comparable cognitive aspects of 
emotional experience, lower physiological response in anticipation of emotional events might 
hinder HA from effectively preparing to respond to emotional events. 
To conclude, the present experiment shows that HA exhibit decreased prediction of an 
aversive emotional event compared to LA and MA, indicating a disruption in HA in learning 
to attribute a corresponding emotional value to previously neutral stimuli and use them as 
cues to predict the emotional future. The next experiment will investigate whether this 
difficulty is present also in the case of appetitive stimuli. 
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Experiment 4: no difference in psychophysiological correlates of prediction of 
appetitive stimuli during reward conditioning in alexithymia 
Introduction 
The previous experiment showed that HA presented reduced psychophysiological 
response in anticipation of aversive emotional events during threat conditioning. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be studied whether such impairment in emotional predictions is 
also evident for appetitive events during reward conditioning. 
 Similarly to pavlovian threat conditioning, pavlovian reward conditioning enables the 
individual to learn to predict the occurrence of appetitive events fundamental for survival and 
to prepare to efficiently approach them. In this form of conditioning, a neutral stimulus is 
repeatedly paired with an appetitive UCS, such as the delivery of monetary reward, so that 
the neutral stimulus becomes a CS anticipating the delivery of the reward. Again, increase in 
SCR and changes in subjective affective experience to the CS are observed indicating 
learning of the association between CS and UCS (Delgado, Gillis, & Phelps, 2008). 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the differences between LA, HA and 
MA in learning to predict an appetitive emotional event during pavlovian reward 
conditioning. Sixty LA, MA and HA, as measured by the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20) (Taylor et al., 2003), completed a classical reward conditioning task with partial 
reinforcement. On each trial, one of two colored squares was presented.  During habituation 
none of the stimuli was reinforced to ensure there were no baseline differences in response to 
the stimuli. During acquisition one stimulus was reinforced with the sound of a coin dropping 
in a piggy-bank (UCS) on 80% of trials (CS+) while the other was never reinforced (CS-). 
During extinction no sound was played. Changes in SCR were recorded continuously during 
the experiment as a psychophysiological indicator of the degree of prediction of the UCS. In 
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addition, to assess subjective experience, participants reported the level of liking, excitement 
and happiness experienced at the presentation of each CS. HA were hypothesized to show 
decreased anticipation of the UCS following the presentation of CS+, hence exhibit lower 
SCR to CS+ compared to MA and LA. No differences between MA and LA were expected. 
Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred university students completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20)(Taylor et al., 2003). Depending on the score, students were classified as LA (TAS-
20 ≤ 36), MA (36 < TAS-20 < 61) or HA (TAS-20 ≥ 61) (Franz et al., 2004). Individuals 
from the three groups were randomly contacted and asked to participate in the study. Due to 
the high co-occurrence of alexithymia and depression (S. Li et al., 2015), participants 
completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961), and were excluded from the in 
case their score was higher than the moderate/severe depression cut-off (i.e. 19; n = 3).  
Sixty university students with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders 
completed the study and were included in the analysis (21 males; age M = 21.94, SD = 1.69 
years) divided in three groups: 20 LA participants (7 males; TAS-20 M = 31.89, SD = 2.51; 
age M = 21.44, SD = 1.60 years); 20 MA participants (7 males; TAS-20 M = 44.21, SD = 
6.09; age M = 22.5, SD = 1.83 years); 20 HA participants (7 males; TAS-20 M = 63.73, SD = 
2.31; age M = 21.88, SD =  1.54 years). A priori targets for sample size and data collection 
stopping rule were based on sample and effect sizes reported in the literature on classical 
conditioning (sample size around 17-19 participants per group as indicated by a recent meta-
analysis (Fullana et al., 2015)). 
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Levels of anxiety were measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger 
et al., 1983). Levels of anxiety in the three groups differed significantly both for state (F(2, 
57) = 11.27, p<.001) and trait anxiety (F(2, 57) = 21.40, p < .001). Post-hoc Newman-Keuls 
test showed that for state anxiety LA (M = 34.26) had significantly lower levels of anxiety 
compared to HA (M = 41.42; p < .001) but not to MA (M = 35.68; p = .377), while for trait 
anxiety all groups differed significantly from each other, with LA (M = 38.16) showing lower 
levels of trait anxiety compared to MA (M = 44.32; p = .008) and HA (M = 52.84; p < .001) 
and MA showing lower levels of trait anxiety compared to HA (p < .001). Correlations 
between levels of anxiety and differential SCR response were explored to exclude an effect of 
anxiety on results. Neither trait nor state anxiety correlated significantly with difference in 
SCR to the two conditioned stimuli (all p ≥ .194). 
The study was designed and conducted in accordance with the ethical principles of the 
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional guidelines of the 
University of Bologna and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of 
Psychology. All participants gave informed written consent to participation after being 
informed about the procedure of the study. 
Independent measure 
Pavlovian reward conditioning. The task consisted in a classical differential reward 
conditioning paradigm with partial reinforcement. Two isoluminant colored squares 
represented the CS. The UCS consisted of a sound of a coin dropping into a piggy bank of 
1000ms in duration, which indicated participants were earning 1€. The volume of the sound 
was kept constant across participants. 
Each trial consisted in the presentation of one CS in the centre of a computer screen 
(17’’, refresh rate 60Hz) for 6 seconds followed by an inter trial interval of 12 seconds during 
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which a fixation cross was presented (Fig. 8). The task included 44 trials (22 for each CS) 
divided in three blocks: habituation, acquisition and extinction.  
At the beginning of habituation, instructions appeared on the screen stating that two 
different images would be presented one at the time in the centre of the screen, no stimulation 
would be administered and the task of the participant would be to carefully observe the 
images. Habituation included 4 trials (2 for each CS) to ensure the absence of any baseline 
differences within and between groups in response to the images. At the beginning of 
acquisition similar instructions stated that the same two images would appear one at the time 
in the centre of the screen and that one of them might be paired with the sound of the coin 
and the task of participants was to carefully observe the images. No information was given 
about the contingencies between images and the sound. Acquisition included 20 trials (10 for 
each CS). CS+ was reinforced in 80% of the trials (n = 8), while CS- was never reinforced. 
Extinction followed acquisition without any instructions. It included 20 trials (10 for each 
CS) and no sound was played.  
 
Figure 8. Illustration of a CS- trial and a CS+ trial, in which the presentation of the CS+ was reinforced by the sound of the 
coin. 
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Stimuli were presented in pseudo randomized order, no more than two presentations 
of the same stimulus occurred in a row (Schiller et al., 2008). The first two trials of 
acquisition always included one CS- and one CS+ presented randomly. The color of the 
square associated to the CS+ and CS- was counterbalanced across participants. 
Dependent measures 
Skin conductance response recording and processing. The SCR was recorded through two 
Ag/AgCl electrodes (TSD203 Model; Biopac Systems, USA), filled with isotonic 
hyposaturated conductant attached to the distal phalanges of the second and third finger of 
participants’ left hand and held with Velcro straps. The SCR signal was continuously 
recorded at 200Hz and amplified using a DC amplifier (Biopac GSR100; Biopac Systems, 
USA) with 5µS/V gain factor and 10Hz low pass filter. The analogue signal was digitalized 
using the MP-150 digital converter (Biopac Systems, USA) and fed into AcqKnowledge 3.9 
software (Biopac Systems, USA). 
SCR data were analyzed using MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., USA) custom-made 
scripts (Garofalo et al., 2014). SCR was calculated as the peak-to-peak amplitude difference 
of the largest deflection in the 0.5-4.5sec latency window after stimulus onset. Regarding 
SCR to UCS, stimulus onset was represented by the beginning of the sound playing, while 
regarding SCR to CS, stimulus onset referred to the time of CS appearance. The SCR was 
transformed into microsiemens (µS) and calculated for each trial. Minimum response 
criterion was 0.02µS and smaller responses were encoded as zero. Square root transformation 
was conducted on raw SCR to normalize the data distribution and SCR were scaled to each 
subject’s maximal UCS response to account for interindividual variability (Schiller et al., 
2008).  
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Both SCR to UCS and CS- were analyzed to ensure that groups did not differ in their 
physiological response to the sound or in the anticipatory response to CS- but only to a 
conditioned stimulus that predicts an appetitive event (i.e. CS+). Regarding SCR to UCS, 
both peak response and average response were analyzed. For each participant, peak response 
represented the highest SCR in response to the eight coins while mean response was the 
average of the SCRs to the eight coins. Regarding the response to CSs, SCRs during the three 
phases of conditioning were analyzed separately. Concerning habituation, all trials were 
included in the analysis. With regards to acquisition, the first two trials were not included in 
the analysis because participants learned the association between UCS and CS+ after its first 
pairing with the coin sound. Regarding extinction, all trials were included in the analysis but 
this phase was divided in two blocks (early and late extinction). Then, mean SCR of each 
participant was computed to produce four average scores representing the SCR of each 
subject during habituation, acquisition, early and late extinction. These were then averaged to 
obtain the SCR during the different phases for each alexithymia group. 
Assessment of subjective liking, excitement, happiness and contingency awareness. 
Participants were asked to report how much they liked each CS and the level of excitement 
and happiness experienced at the presentation of each CS on separate visual analogue scales 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extreme). The order of questions was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Participants were also asked to indicate which of the two stimuli was associated with 
the coin to ensure explicit awareness of pairing between CS+ and UCS. All participants 
reported the correct association. 
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Procedure 
The experiment took place in a sound attenuated room with dimmed light. 
Participants were seated in a chair in front of a computer monitor at ~70 cm distance. Once 
seated, the experimental procedure was explained and written informed consent was obtained 
from participants. Then SCR electrodes were attached and correct recording of the signal was 
ensured. Participants were then told the task consisted of two phases and that instructions 
would appear on the screen for each phase. Also, participants were familiarized with the 
sound of the coin and told it might play in the second phase. They were also reassured that 
the coins earned were real money they would be given at the end of the session. Following 
completion of the task, subjective reports were completed and the reward was given. 
Results 
No difference in peak and mean SCR to UCS among groups 
Univariate ANOVAs were used to evaluate differences in UCS intensity and mean 
and peak SCR to the UCS. Results showed no significant differences among the three groups 
in either peak SCR in response to UCS (MLA = 0.73 µS, MMA  = 0.83 µS, MHA = 0.92 µS; 
F(2, 57) = 2.28, p = .111, partial η2 = .07) or mean SCR in response to UCS (MLA = 0.40 µS, 
MMA = 0.43 µS, MHA = 0.49 µS; F(2, 57) = 0.72, p =.489, partial η
2
 = .02). On average, the 
physiological response to the UCS did not differ significantly among groups. 
No difference in SCR among groups or stimuli during habituation 
A 3x2 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-) was carried out to 
analyze SCR during habituation. Analysis on SCR showed no significant main effect of 
group (F(2, 57) = 1.69, p = .194, partial η2 = .05), stimulus (F(1, 57) = .71, p = .400, partial η2 
= .01) or interaction (F(2, 57) = 1.87, p = .163, partial η2 = .06), confirming that at baseline 
70 
 
there were neither within group nor between group differences in response to the two 
conditioned stimuli. 
No difference between groups in the acquisition and extinction of conditioning 
A 3x2x3 RM ANOVA (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-; phase: acquisition, 
early extinction, late extinction) was carried out to analyze SCR in the phases following 
habituation. Analysis on SCR showed significant main effect of phase (F(2,114) = 7.03, p = 
.001, partial η2 = .11). However, this was secondary to a significant stimulus by phase 
interaction (F(2,114) = 3.44, p = .035, partial η2 = .06). Post-hoc Newman Keuls test 
indicated that during acquisition participants had higher SCR to the CS+ than CS- (p=.004; 
MCS+=.12, MCS-=.16; Fig 9). On the contrary there was no difference in SCR to the 
conditioned stimuli during extinction (all ps≥.855; Fig 10). Also, no main effect or interaction 
with the factor group was found (all ps≥.232). The results indicate that groups showed 
comparable acquisition and extinction of appetitive conditioning. 
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Figure 9. Mean square rooted skin conductance response (SCR) to CS+ and CS- during acquisition as a function of 
alexithymia group. In all groups, SCR was higher to the CS+ than CS-. This differential response appears comparable across 
groups, as suggested by a main effect of stimulus shown by the statistical analysis, indicating significantly higher SCR to 
CS+ than CS-. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean square rooted skin conductance response (SCR) to CS+ and CS- during extinction as a function of 
alexithymia group. All groups extinguished differential SCR between CS+ and CS-, as suggested by the statistical analysis. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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No difference in subjective reports of liking, excitement and happiness among groups 
3x2 RM ANOVAs (group: LA, MA, HA; stimulus: CS+, CS-) were conducted on 
subjective reports of liking, excitement and happiness experienced at the presentation of the 
CSs. The subjective report on liking showed a significant main effect of stimulus (F(1, 57) = 
37.48, p < .001, partial η2 = .40). Participants liked the CS+ more than the CS- (p < .001, 
MCS+ = 60.64%, MCS- = 35.38%). No significant main effect of group or interaction was 
found (all ps≥.294).  
The subjective report on excitement showed a main effect of stimulus (F(1, 57) = 
69.69, p < .001, partial η2 = .55) and a stimulus by group interaction (F(1, 57) = 3.66, p = 
.032, partial η2 = .11). Nevertheless, this appeared to be driven by a spurious comparison, 
because within each group participants were more excited at the presentation of the CS+ than 
the CS- (all ps≤.002) and between groups there were no differences in the degree of 
excitement to the CS+ (all ps≥.122) or CS- (all ps≥.113) . 
The subjective report on happiness showed a significant main effect of stimulus (F(1, 
57) = 58.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .50). Participants were happier at the presentation of the 
CS+ than the CS- (p < .001, MCS+ = 57.17%, MCS- = 28.13%). No significant main effect of 
group or interaction was found (all ps≥.062).  
Discussion 
This experiment investigated whether alexithymia presented reduced prediction of 
appetitive emotional events. To this end, changes in SCR were recorded during pavlovian 
reward conditioning to assess differences among LA, MA and HA in predicting the 
occurrence of a positive emotional event by learning patterns of association between CS+ and 
UCS. 
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 Similarly to the previous experiment, behavioral results showed that participants 
correctly associated CS+ and UCS, suggesting that they explicitly identified the stimulus that 
anticipated the appetitive event. In addition, groups did not differ in the SCR to the appetitive 
stimulus and emotional experience reported in response to presentation of CS+. Specifically, 
all groups reported comparable arousal in response to the appetitive stimulus. In addition, 
they also reported higher levels of subjective liking, excitement and happiness in response to 
the stimulus predicting the appetitive UCS than the neutral one. However, contrary to the 
results found during threat conditioning, no significant difference was found in physiological 
arousal in anticipation of the appetitive stimulus among the three alexithymia groups in any 
of the phases of conditioning. Indeed, all groups appeared to learn to discriminate a neutral 
stimulus from a stimulus predicting an appetitive event. In addition, HA appeared to acquire 
and extinguish the prediction of a coming appetitive stimulus to a degree comparable to LA 
and MA.  
The difference in results between the two experiments may be driven by differences 
in the neural circuit underling threat and reward conditioning and the dependent measure 
used to assess prediction of the UCSs. Although changes in SCR are a standard dependent 
measure to assess reward conditioning, these might be differentially modulated in threat as 
opposed to reward learning. Indeed, changes in SCR have been shown to be driven by 
variation in neural activity in the connections from the central complex of the amygdala to 
the hypothalamus (Cardinal et al., 2002; McNally & Westbrook, 2006). In this regard, a 
recent study, performing cell activity recording in mice, showed different neural populations 
responded to the anticipation of threat and reward. Specifically, the anticipation of aversive 
stimuli seems to mainly excite neurons projecting from the basolateral amygdala to the 
central amygdala, while, that of appetitive stimuli, neurons projecting from the basolateral 
amygdala to the nucleus accumbens (Beyeler et al., 2016). Therefore, the amygdala might 
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have a more prominent role in modulating SCR in threat than reward conditioning. From the 
data, it can be noted that the overall level of SCR is higher during threat conditioning than 
reward conditioning. Indeed, while there is evidence of its causal role in the acquisition of 
threat conditioning measured through SCR in humans (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 
1995), the causal role of the amygdala in the acquisition of reward conditioning is less 
definitive (Murray & Baxter, 2002; though see Bechara et al., 1999). Possibly, in this 
experiment, changes in SCR might have been sensitive in discriminating between CS- and 
CS+, but might not be sensitive enough in uncover subtle group differences in emotional 
learning.  
To conclude, the current experiment did not find any significant difference in learning 
to predict appetitive stimuli in alexithymia. The present results, together with those of the 
previous experiment, may suggest that the difficulties of HA in predicting emotional events 
may be more severe for aversive than appetitive emotional events. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that this negative result may be related to the dependent measure used to assess reward 
conditioning. This leaves open the possibility that HA may still have difficulties in predicting 
appetitive emotional stimuli, which may become evident with measures of neural rather than 
physiological activity. 
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Experiment 5: reduced electrophysiological correlates of prediction and 
prediction error to appetitive stimuli during pavlovian reward conditioning in 
alexithymia 
Introduction 
While Experiment 3 showed reduced prediction of aversive stimuli in alexithymia 
during threat conditioning, Experiment 4 did not show a similar impairment in the prediction 
of appetitive stimuli during reward conditioning. Nevertheless, the result of Experiment 2 
may partly be related to the dependent measure used in the experiment, leaving open the 
possibility of alexithymia being indeed related to impairment in predicting coming appetitive 
stimuli, which may become evident with the use of a dependent measure that reflects a more 
direct measure of neural activity related to emotional prediction. Therefore, recording of 
electrophysiological activity through electroencephalogram (EEG) and specifically event 
related potentials (ERP) representing emotional prediction signals could be used. In this 
regard, the CUE-P300 component has been previously shown to be sensitive to the 
anticipation of reward (Pfabigan et al., 2014; Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965). This is a 
positive deflection in electrical potential observed at centroparietal electrodes peaking 300-
600ms after CS presentation, which appears to have a role in the evaluation of motivationally 
salient stimuli (Pornpattananangkul & Nusslock, 2015), being larger for stimuli predicting 
reward compared to no-reward (Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006) and could be used 
to assess the prediction of appetitive stimuli during pavlovian reward conditioning. 
In addition to prediction, prediction error plays an equally fundamental role in 
constructing accurate internal representation of emotional stimuli and learning in general. In 
fact, during associative learning, on each trial the organism compares the reinforcer delivered 
(or not) on that trial (e.g. monetary reward) with its own prediction about the delivery of that 
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reinforcer, which had been learned during previous trials (Daw & Tobler, 2014). In case of a 
mismatch between the prediction and the actual outcome, a prediction error occurs, which 
signals the need for more learning to update the prediction (Friston, 2010). The EEG can be 
used to also record electrophysiological correlates of such prediction error, recording an ERP 
named feedback related negativity (FRN). This is a negative deflection in electrical potential 
observed at frontocentral electrodes between 200-350ms after a stimulus indicating whether 
reward or no reward is delivered (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). As such, it is calculated as the 
difference wave resulting from subtracting the electrical potential following reward omission 
from that following reward delivery (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). Importantly, this 
component is modulated by expectations, such that the difference wave is more negative for 
unexpected compared to expected events, corroborating its role in encoding a prediction error 
signal (e.g. Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 2013; Talmi et al., 2013; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). 
The aim of the current experiment is to assess differences in electrophysiological 
correlates of predictions as well as prediction errors in HA and LA for appetitive stimuli. To 
this end, EEG was recorded continuously from HA and LA participants during a pavlovian 
reward conditioning task, in order to assess CUE-P300 during the anticipation of reward and 
FRN in response to the unexpected reward-related feedback. During the task, two CS (CS1 & 
CS2) were presented. Each CS was followed by a feedback indicating delivery of monetary 
reward or of no-reward. In 80% of trials, CS1 was associated to the delivery of reward, while 
CS2 to the delivery of no-reward. As the task progresses, LA should learn such associations 
and construct corresponding predictions of CS1 anticipating reward while CS2 no-reward. 
Therefore LA are hypothesized to have enhanced CUE-P300 in response to CS1 than CS2. 
On the contrary, HA are hypothesized to have difficulties in learning such predictions and 
present a reduction in the modulation of the CUE-P300 compared to LA. Importantly, the 
task also included two events that violate the learned predictions. Specifically, in the 
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remaining 20% of trials, the stimulus-feedback association was inverted, resulting in an 
unexpected reward-related feedback. In LA, this is hypothesized to lead to a prediction error, 
manifested as enhanced FRN in response to the unexpected compared to the expected 
reward-related feedback. On the contrary, HA are hypothesized to have reduced prediction 
error, because of the reduced prediction. Therefore, HA should have reduced modulation of 
the FRN compared to LA. In addition to EEG data, behavioral measures of participants’ 
degree of learning and changes in subjective experience in response to the CS were also 
collected, although, given the results of previous experiments, no difference between groups 
was expected on these measures. 
Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred individuals completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
20; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003). Depending on the score, students were classified as LA 
(TAS-20 ≤ 36) or HA (TAS-20 ≥ 61) (Franz et al., 2004) and were then randomly contacted 
to participate in the study. Once in the laboratory, the alexithymia module of the structured 
interview for the Diagnostic Criteria for Psychosomatic Research (DCPR; (Mangelli et al., 
2006) was administered to increase reliability of screening and confirm TAS-20 
classification. Participants with discordant classification on the two measures did not 
complete the task (n = 1). Due to the high co-occurrence of alexithymia and depression (S. Li 
et al., 2015), participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) and 
did not complete the experimental task in case their score was higher than the 
moderate/severe depression cut-off (i.e. 19, n = 1). Levels of anxiety were measured with the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983). 
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All participants had equivalent educational backgrounds and were students at the 
University of Bologna. The study was designed and conducted in accordance with the ethical 
principles of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional 
guidelines of the University of Bologna and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
Department of Psychology. All participants gave informed written consent to participation 
after being informed about the procedure of the study. 
Forty-two volunteers with no history of major medical, neurological or psychiatric 
disorders completed the study (22 LA, 21HA). Data from two LA participants and 1 HA 
participant were removed from further analysis due to excessive noise in the EEG signal. In 
total 40 participants were included in the analysis: 20 LA (6 males; age M = 21.97, SD = 1.57 
years; TAS-20 M = 31.80, SD = 2.82; STAI state M = 35.16, SD = 5.08; STAI trait M = 
40.65, SD = 6.38); 20 HA (6 males; age M = 21.97, SD = 2.27 years; TAS-20 M = 64.00, SD 
= 4.30; STAI state M = 37.65, SD = 6.09; STAI trait M = 48.47, SD = 8.80). HA had 
significantly higher trait anxiety than LA (t(38)=3.19, p=.003); nevertheless, correlations 
between anxiety and the dependent measures were not significant (all ps≥.081).  
A priori targets for sample size and data collection stopping rule were based on 
sample and effect sizes reported in a previous EEG study on alexithymia and error related 
negativity (ERN) (Maier et al., 2016), a mediofrontal component that is also considered a 
prediction error signal following performance error (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Gehring, 
Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). 
Independent measures 
Pavlovian appetitive conditioning. Two neutral stimuli representing the conditioned stimuli 
(CS) were presented followed by a feedback indicating the delivery of reward or of no-
reward. Each CS consisted in a 3cm white square with a Japanese hiragana on it, reward 
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consisted in the writing “1€” and no-reward in the writing “0€”. In order to manipulate 
reward expectations, the percentage of reward delivery was varied for each CS. Specifically, 
CS1 was followed by the delivery of reward in 80% (i.e. expected reward condition) of the 
trials and no-reward in 20% of trials (i.e. unexpected no-reward condition). On the contrary, 
CS2 followed by to the delivery of no-reward in 80% of the trials (i.e. expected no-reward 
condition) and reward in 20% of trials (i.e. unexpected reward condition) (Table 2). Stimuli 
were displayed on a 17-inch color monitor (refresh rate 60Hz) with a black background, at a 
viewing distance of 80 cm. A PC running E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) controlled stimulus presentation and behavioral response recording. Stimuli 
were balanced for luminance, complexity and color saturation. 
Table 2. Illustration of experimental conditions with an example CS1 and CS2 stimuli. 
 
 
Each trial consisted in the presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen 
for 500ms, followed by the presentation of CS to the right or left of the fixation cross for 
1500ms, followed by the feedback for 1000ms, followed by an inter trial interval of 1000- 
1500ms during which a blank screen was presented (Fig. 11). To ensure the attention of 
participants was maintained throughout the task, 48 catch trials were included during which, 
a scrambled image of the CS was presented, followed by the presentation of the blank screen. 
The task included 848 trials in total, divided in 8 blocks of 108 trials each. The order of trials 
was randomized and in each block the two CSs were presented the same number of times. 
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After the first four blocks, both CS were changed and participants had to learn the new 
stimulus-feedback associations. The assignment of each CS to a particular condition was 
counterbalanced among participants. 
 
Figure 11. Illustration of experimental trial. 
 
Dependent measures 
Explicit assessment of learning. To evaluate understanding of the task and explicit learning 
of stimulus-feedback association, participants were asked to report how many stimuli they 
saw and to briefly describe them. All participants correctly reported to having seen two 
stimuli and were able to describe them. In addition, participants were asked what they noticed 
about the stimulus-feedback association. A score of 1 was given for correctly reporting which 
stimulus was mostly associated with which feedback, while a score of 0.5 for reporting that 
one stimulus was mostly associated with reward while the other with no-reward but failing to 
identify which one, all other responses were given a score of 0. 
Self-report liking. To assess changes in subjective experience following conditioning, 
participants were asked to report how much they liked each CS on a visual analogue scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). 
81 
 
EEG recording and pre-processing. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with 
Ag/AgCl electrodes (Fast n Easy Electrodes; Easycap, Herrsching, Germany) from 59 
electrode sites (Fp1, Fp2, AF3, AF4, AF7, AF8, F1, F2, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, 
FC5, FC6, FT7, FT8, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, T7, T8, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, TP7, 
TP8, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8, O1, O2, FPz, AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, 
CPz, Pz, POz, Oz) and from the right mastoid. The reference electrode was placed on the left 
mastoid and the ground electrode on the right cheek. Signal impedance was maintained below 
10 KΩ. The electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from above and below the left eye and 
from the outer canthi of both eyes. EEG and EOG were recorded with a band-pass filter of 
0.01–100 Hz, amplified by a BrainAmp DC amplifier (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) 
and digitized at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz.  
The EEG data were pre-processed using EEGLAB free toolbox, version 14.1.0b 
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004), and custom routines written in MATLAB R2013a (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA). The ERP data were re-referenced offline to the right mastoid 
(Luck, 2014) and filtered with a 1- to 30-Hz band-pass filter. To extract the signal in response 
to the CSs, stimulus-locked epochs from –100 to 700ms relative to the appearance of the CS 
were extracted from the continuous EEG. To extract the signal in response to the feedbacks, 
stimulus-locked epochs from –100 to 500ms relative to the appearance of the feedback were 
extracted from the continuous EEG. Epochs were baseline-corrected using the average 
voltage during the 100ms pre-stimulus window. Epochs were excluded in case the voltage on 
a single channel exceeded 400μV to remove trials with large voltage fluctuations and in case 
they contained data deviating more than 5SDs from the mean of the joint probability 
distribution to remove improbable data. To correct remaining artifacts, the data were 
subjected to a temporal independent component analysis (Jutten & Herault, 1991; Makeig, 
Bell, Jung, & Sejnowski, 1996) using the infomax algorithm (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995).The 
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resulting component matrix was screened for independent components (ICs) representing 
stereotyped artifact activity, such as horizontal (saccades) and vertical (blinks) eye 
movements, and muscle artifacts. This was done using a multistep correlational template-
matching process, implemented in CORRMAP, version 1.03 (Viola et al., 2009). 
Topographies of ICs labeled as artifacts by the CORRMAP procedure were visually 
inspected and then calculated out of the data using inverse matrix multiplication. Finally, to 
avoid a possible influence of differing numbers of trial on the average ERP results, the trial 
number was matched for the four experimental conditions through data re-sampling 
(Garofalo et al., 2016). For each participant, the condition with the smallest number of trials 
was identified and the corresponding number of trials was randomly drawn from each of the 
remaining conditions for 1000 iterations. Then, an average ERP was calculated for each 
iteration separately for each condition. The resulting components were then averaged over all 
iterations separately for each condition producing four ERPs per participant used for data 
analysis.  
ERP quantification 
Cue-P300 in response to the stimulus. Scalp topographies of the mean voltage in the 
interval 300-500ms following CS appearance showed maximum activation at parietal 
electrodes in both groups (Fig. 12). The grand average waveforms at electrode Pz, showed a 
positive deflection peaking around 350ms after CS onset in both groups, resembling the 
CUE-P300 component (Fig. 13). Statistical analysis was performed on individual waveforms 
representing the mean amplitude recorded in the 300-500ms interval following CS 
appearance. 
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Figure 12. Scalp topographies of the mean voltage in the interval 300-500ms following CS1 and CS2 appearance for the low 
and high alexithymia group showing maximum activation at parietal electrodes in both groups  
 
 
Figure 13. Grand average waveforms at electrode Pz for CS1 and CS2 for low and high alexithymia group. 0 on the x axis 
indicates time point of stimulus appearance; dashed lines indicate time interval for analysis. 
 
FRN in response to the feedback. Scalp topographies of the mean voltage difference 
between reward and no-reward feedback in the interval 200-300ms following feedback 
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showed maximum difference in activation at central electrodes in both groups (Fig. 14). For 
each condition, the grand average waveforms at electrode Cz, where FRN has been 
previously reported (Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), showed a negative deflection peaking 
around 250ms after feedback onset in both groups (Fig 15). Separate FRNs were computed 
for the expected and unexpected conditions, calculating the difference wave between the no-
reward and reward conditions for the expected and unexpected condition for each group. 
Statistical analysis was performed on the mean amplitude of the FRN recorded in the 200-
300ms following feedback appearance. 
 
Figure 14. Scalp topographies of the mean voltage difference between no-reward and reward feedback in the interval 200-
300ms following feedback for the expected and unexpected conditions in the low and high alexithymia group showing 
maximum difference in activation at central electrodes in both groups 
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Figure 15. Grand average waveforms at electrode Cz for reward and no-reward in the expected and unexpected conditions, 
as well as FRN in the low and high alexithymia group. 0 on the x axis indicates time point of stimulus appearance; dashed 
lines indicate time interval for analysis. 
 
Procedure 
The task took place in a sound attenuated room with dimmed light. After the EEG cap 
was mounted, participants were asked to seat comfortably on the chair. They were instructed 
that on each trial they would see a stimulus appearing on the left or right of the screen 
followed by the feedback “1€” or “0€” that indicated the reward for that trial. Their task was 
to pay attention to the association between the stimulus and feedback because they would 
earn part of the reward at the end of the task. In addition, participants were instructed to press 
one of two keys on the keyboard corresponding to the side of presentation of the symbol, as 
soon as the stimulus appeared on the screen. They were asked to be as fast and as accurate as 
they could in their response, but were informed that neither speed nor accuracy of response 
would affect the feedback appearance to avoid the possibility they associated the reward with 
their actions. In addition, they were told that sometimes, a scrambled picture would appear 
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instead of the stimulus and they should not press any key. Participants could take a break to 
rest at the end of each block. 
At the end of the fourth block and of the task, participants were asked to report how 
much they liked each CS. Also, participants were asked to report how many stimuli they saw 
and to briefly describe them. All participants correctly reported to having seen two stimuli 
and were able to describe them. In addition, participants were asked what they noticed about 
the stimulus-feedback association. 
At the end of the session, participants received 10€ as a reward. 
Results 
Reduced prediction in anticipation of reward-related feedback in alexithymia 
The 2x2x2 RM ANOVA (CS type: CS1, CS2; group: LA, HA) conducted on the 
mean amplitude of the CUE-P300 revealed a main effect of group. CUE-P300 amplitude in 
response to the CSs was larger for LA than HA (F(1, 38)=5.25, p=.028, partial η2 = 0.12; 
MLA=7.53, MHA=5.52; Fig. 16). All other factors were not significant (all ps≥.112). The result 
suggests HA had reduced anticipation of reward-related outcome compared to LA. 
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Figure 16. CUE-P300 mean voltage for CS1 and CS2 as a function of alexithymia group. Higher voltage was found for 
individuals with low than high alexithymia. Error bars represent standard errors. Significant differences are indicated as 
follows: *p< .05. 
 
Absent prediction error to unexpected reward-related feedback in alexithymia 
The 2x2 RM ANOVA (feedback expectation: expected, unexpected; group: LA, HA) 
conducted on the mean amplitude of the FRN revealed a main effect of feedback expectation 
(F(1, 38)=4.39, p=.043, partial η2 = 0.104), which was secondary to the group by feedback 
expectation interaction (F(1, 38)=4.39, p=.043, partial η2 = 0.104; Fig. 17). Bonferroni post-
hoc test showed that LA had larger FRN for the unexpected compared to the expected 
condition (p=.020, Munexpected=-1.70, Mexpected=-.143). On the contrary HA, did not show any 
modulation of the FRN (p=1.000). All other comparisons were not significant (p≥.619). 
These results suggest that HA did not compute a prediction error in response to unexpected 
reward-related outcome compared to LA. 
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Figure 17. FRN mean voltage for expected and unexpected condition as a function of alexithymia group. A significant 
difference between the two conditions was found only in the low alexithymia group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Significant differences are indicated as follows: *p< .05. 
 
Reduced explicit learning of CS-feedback contingencies in alexithymia 
The 2x2x2 RM ANOVA (CS type: CS1, CS2; block: 1-4, 5-8; group: LA, HA) 
showed a main effect of group (F(1, 38)=4.22, p=.047, partial η2 = 0.10; Fig. 18). HA 
(M=0.86) showed less understanding of the CS-feedback contingencies compared to LA 
(M=0.97). All other factors were not significant (p≥.090). 
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Figure 18. Mean accuracy of stimulus feedback association for CS1 and CS2 as a function of alexithymia group. The low 
alexithymia group had better accuracy in reporting the stimulus-feedback association. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Significant differences are indicated as follows: *p< .05. 
 
No difference in subjective liking of CSs between groups 
The 2x2x2 RM ANOVA (CS type: rewarding, non-rewarding; block: 1-4, 5-8; group: 
LA, HA) showed a main effect of CS type (F(1, 37)=10.129, p=.003, partial η2 = 0.21). In 
both groups, participants liked the rewarding CS more than the non-rewarding CS 
(Mrewarding=72.03, Mnon-rewarding=55.91). All other factors were not significant (p≥.193). Note 
that data for one LA participant was missing because the software failed to record the 
responses. 
 Discussion 
The current experiment tested the electrophysiological correlates of prediction and 
prediction error during reward conditioning in LA and HA. Electrophysiological results 
found that HA had reduced CUE-P300 during the anticipation of monetary reward-related 
feedback compared to LA. In addition, HA did not show an enhancement of FRN in response 
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to unexpected reward-related feedback compared to LA. Behavioral results showed that HA 
also had less understanding of the association between stimuli and reward-related feedback. 
These results indicate that HA have reduced prediction of coming rewards and prediction 
error in response to unexpected reward-related feedback suggesting decreased ability to 
construct accurate internal representations of coming appetitive stimuli. 
The CUE-P300 has been previously identified as an electrophysiological marker of 
reward prediction, being larger not only for reward compared to no-reward but also for larger 
compared to smaller rewards (Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006; Pornpattananangkul 
& Nusslock, 2015). Following this, larger CUE-P300 was hypothesized in LA in response to 
the stimulus predicting reward than the one predicting no-reward. Contrary to this hypothesis 
and the previous literature, there was no evidence of such modulation of the CUE-P300 in 
LA. This result may be related to the fact that in the current experiment, both stimuli 
predicted reward delivery, even though with different probabilities and although the CS2 
predicted reward delivery only in 20% of trials, leading to overall less earning compared to 
CS1, the magnitude of reward was the same for both stimuli. Indeed, previous literature has 
shown a modulation of the cue-P300 related to reward magnitude (Goldstein et al., 2006). 
However, whether this component is modulated also by reward likelihood has not been 
clarified. Here the results suggest that reward likelihood does not seem to affect the 
amplitude of CUE-P300.  
The crucial result, however, regards the difference in amplitude of the between LA 
and HA, which was reduced in HA compared to LA, suggesting reduced prediction of 
coming appetitive stimuli in alexithymia. This result is in line with the current literature on 
alexithymia that has shown reduced P300 in response to emotional stimuli (Bermond, 
Righart, Ridderinkhof, & Moormann, 2008; Pollatos et al., 2011; Pollatos & Gramann, 2012). 
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In addition, the broader literature on emotion processing shows enhancement of the P300 in 
response to motivationally salient stimuli, such as emotional pictures, gain or loss of money 
and target stimuli in attention tasks (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Olofsson, 
Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Polich, 2007). This effect has been interpreted as an 
increase in attentional resources devoted towards such stimuli. In keeping with this, HA may 
attribute less motivational salience to the stimuli that anticipate coming rewards compared to 
LA and pay less attention to the information conveyed by such stimuli, ultimately impairing 
the accurate prediction of coming reward. 
This deduction is further supported by the other main result of the current experiment, 
namely the lack of modulation of the FRN in response to unexpected reward-related feedback 
in HA compared to LA. The FRN has been argued to represent an electrophysiological 
marker of prediction error, signaling the non-occurrence of a predicted event, enabling the 
organism to correct its prediction in order to construct accurate expectations regarding 
coming events (Alexander & Brown, 2011). In addition, according to the Pearce and Hall’s 
model of learning, the size of the prediction error would modulate the amount of attention 
driven to the cues predicting the reward-related feedback, with larger prediction error 
increasing attention hence promoting learning (Roesch, Esber, Li, Daw, & Schoenbaum, 
2012).  Here, the results indicate that HA do not compute a prediction error in response to 
unexpected reward-related feedback, hindering accurate emotional learning and exacerbating 
the difficulty in constructing accurate representations of coming appetitive stimuli.  
There is evidence that the P300 and FRN may be related to the dopamine system, 
which plays a fundamental role in emotional learning and in encoding prediction errors 
(Schultz, 1998, 2016). Specifically, P300 amplitude showed positive correlation with blood 
oxygen level dependent response in the ventral striatum during reward anticipation (Pfabigan 
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et al., 2014), appears positively related to availability of D2 receptors in the striatum 
(Pogarell et al., 2011), has been related with polymorphism in genes encoding dopamine D2 
(Berman et al., 2006) and D3 (Mulert et al., 2006) receptors and increases following 
administration of amphetamine (McKetin, Ward, Catts, Mattick, & Bell, 1999). Regarding 
the FRN, studies suggest this component originates from activity in the ACC (Holroyd et al., 
2004; Warren, Hyman, Seamans, & Holroyd, 2015), which may be related to phasic changes 
in dopamine activity resulting from dopaminergic projections from midbrain structures to this 
area (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). It 
might be possible that the differences observed in HA in the electrophysiological components 
may be related to differences in the dopaminergic system. In addition, differences in activity 
in the ACC have also been shown in alexithymia (van der Velde et al., 2014), possibly 
suggesting an overlapping neural mechanism for the difficulty in emotional learning in 
alexithymia and its broader difficulties in processing emotional stimuli.  
Contrary to the previous experiments, the difficulty in reward learning in HA, 
evidenced by electrophysiological, data was corroborated by the behavioral data showing less 
accurate verbal report regarding the stimulus-reward association in HA compared to LA. One 
difference between the current experiment and the previous ones, is that, rather than having 
one CS associated to reward while another never associated to reward, both CSs were 
associated to reward, differing only in their reinforcement rate. It is possible, that in these 
circumstances, more effort may be required to learn the accurate value of each stimulus and 
this may be especially challenging for HA, manifested as worse behavioral performance in 
reporting stimulus-reward contingency. Despite this, groups did not show a difference in the 
degree of liking of the CSs. Both groups liked the CS mostly followed by reward more than 
the one mostly followed by no-reward to comparable degree. Similarly to what reported in 
Experiment 3, these results suggest dissociation between processes underlying different 
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aspects of emotional learning and that HA may present difficulties in some but not all of 
these aspects. 
In summary, the results on the CUE-P300 and FRN suggest a broken feedback loop in 
HA between prediction and prediction error signals during pavlovian reward conditioning. 
HA show reduced prediction of coming appetitive emotional stimuli. This inaccurate 
prediction may then lead to absent prediction error, which impairs the correction of the 
inaccurate prediction, further contributing to the reduced prediction and to a global 
impairment in constructing accurate internal representations of appetitive emotional events. 
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Experiment 6: Alexithymia requires more time to accurately avoid stimuli that 
have acquired aversive value following instrumental learning 
Introduction 
The experiments presented so far suggest that alexithymia is related to difficulties in 
constructing accurate predictions of coming aversive and appetitive stimuli during Pavlovian 
conditioning. One limitation of this type of learning is that the organism learns the 
contingency between a stimulus (CS) and an outcome (UCS). Nevertheless, in everyday life, 
the organism is an active agent in its surrounding environment, changing its behavior based 
on the outcome it might lead to. Therefore, in addition to make predictions about stimuli, the 
organism also needs to learn predictions about the outcomes following its actions, in order to 
select the actions that can increase survival. This process is named instrumental learning. 
During instrumental learning, the organism performs different actions, which can be 
rewarded with the delivery of appetitive stimuli or punished with the delivery of aversive 
stimuli. Following the repetition of the actions, the organism learns to predict which actions 
will be rewarded and which actions will be punished. As a consequence, rewarded actions 
will be repeated while punished actions will be terminated, making it another form of 
learning crucial for survival (Daw & Tobler, 2014). In addition, the environment is not a 
static, rather it is ever-changing, so that the same stimuli are rarely encountered in the same 
context twice. Therefore, the organism is also required to flexibly use the information learned 
about the value of actions associated to the stimuli encountered in one context, in order to 
ensure adaptive behavior, when the same stimuli are encountered in a novel context. 
Given the above information, the aim of the current experiment is to investigate 
whether alexithymia also affects instrumental learning and the ability to effectively use the 
information acquired during this type of learning to ensure adaptive behavior in a novel 
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context. To this end, LA and HA completed the Probabilistic Selection Task (Frank, 
Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005). This includes two phases: 
learning and testing. In the learning phase, participants are faced with three pairs of 
characters (AB, CD, and EF). Within each pair, choosing one character is more likely to lead 
to reward (and less likely to lead to punishment) than choosing the other. Importantly, the 
probability of reward and punishment differ for each character (Fig. 20), so that each 
character, and the choice associated to it, acquire a more or less positive or negative value 
compared to the remaining characters. On each trial, participants choose one character of the 
pair and reward (positive feedback) or punishment (negative feedback) following the choice 
is provided. By trial and error, participants are required to learn the character in each pair 
more likely to lead to reward. Then, during testing, participants are again faced with pairs of 
characters; however, all possible combinations of the characters encountered during learning 
are presented. Participants’ task remains to choose the character in each pair more likely to 
lead to reward; nevertheless, no feedback is provided about the choice. The testing phase 
enables to test whether participants can use the information learned about the value of each 
character, and the choice associated to it, to make effective choices when the old characters 
are presented within new pairs. Based on the results of the previous experiments, HA were 
hypothesized to be less able to learn accurate predictions from reward and punishment during 
instrumental learning, showing worse performance than LA in the learning phase. In addition, 
they were also hypothesized to be less able to use what was learned flexibly in a new context, 
hence showing worse performance compared to LA in choice behavior also during testing. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred individuals completed the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
20; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003). Depending on the score, students were classified as LA 
(TAS-20 ≤ 36) or HA (TAS-20 ≥ 61) (Franz et al., 2004) and were then randomly contacted 
to participate in the study. Once in the laboratory, the alexithymia module of the structured 
interview for the Diagnostic Criteria for Psychosomatic Research (DCPR; Mangelli et al., 
2006) was administered to increase reliability of screening and confirm TAS-20 
classification. Participants with discordant classification on the two measures did not 
complete the task (n = 8). Due to the high co-occurrence of alexithymia and depression (S. Li 
et al., 2015), participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) and 
did not complete the experimental task in case their score was higher than the 
moderate/severe depression cut-off (i.e. 19, n = 3). Levels of anxiety were measured with the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) 
All participants had equivalent educational backgrounds and were students at the 
University of Bologna. The study was designed and conducted in accordance with the ethical 
principles of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and the institutional 
guidelines of the University of Bologna and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
Department of Psychology. All participants gave informed written consent to participation 
after being informed about the procedure of the study. 
Forty-two volunteers with no history of major medical, neurological or psychiatric 
disorders completed the study (20 LA, 22HA). Data from two HA were removed from 
analysis because they failed to achieve the performance criterion required for successful 
completion of the learning phase of the task. In total 40 participants were included in the 
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analysis: 20 LA (6 males; age M = 21.44, SD = 1.65 years; TAS-20 M = 31.89, SD = 2.58; 
STAI state M = 34.26, SD = 3.43; STAI trait M = 38.16, SD = 50.55); 20 HA (6 males; age M 
= 21.83 SD = 1.85 years; TAS-20 M = 64.70, SD = 4.59; STAI state M = 40.15, SD = 6.67; 
STAI trait M = 50.55, SD = 8.92). HA had significantly higher state (t(38)=3.53, p=.001) and 
trait anxiety (t(38)=5.35, p<.001) than LA; nevertheless there was no significant correlation 
between anxiety and the dependent measures (all ps≥.076).  
Independent measures 
The experimental task consisted in the Probabilistic Selection Task by (Frank et al., 2004, 
2005). This includes two phases: learning and testing.  
Learning. This phase was a reinforcement learning procedure. On each trial a pair of stimuli 
consisting of hiragana characters appeared on the screen. Every time a pair appeared, the 
participant chose one of the two characters pressing a key on the keyboard. Following the 
choice, feedback appeared on the screen indicating whether the choice was correct (reward) 
or incorrect (punishment). These consisted of a hand with a thumb up or down respectively. 
In total, there were three pairs of stimuli (AB, CD, and EF). In each pair, each character had a 
predetermined probability of being followed by the correct feedback. Specifically, for the AB 
pair, choosing A led to correct feedback (reward) 80% of the time and incorrect (punishment) 
in the remaining 20% of the time, whereas B led to correct feedback (reward) only 20% of 
the time. For the CD pair, choosing C led to correct feedback (reward) 70% of the time, 
whereas D led to correct feedback (reward) only 30% of the time. For the EF pair, choosing E 
led to correct feedback (reward) 60% of the time, whereas F led to correct feedback (reward) 
only 40% of the time (Fig. 20). Participants’ task was to learn to choose the character in each 
pair that leads to correct feedback the majority of trials.  
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Figure 19. Illustration of examples of characters and the feedback probability associated with each character for each type of 
feedback. 
  
 A performance criterion was introduced for each pair to ensure participants achieved 
comparable level of learning before moving to the testing phase. Specifically, this was 65% 
of A for AB, 60% of C in CD and 50% of E in EF. Learning was evaluated at the end of each 
training block consisting of 60 trials (20 per stimulus pair) for a maximum of 4 blocks. 
Participants who did not achieve the criterion after 4 blocks were excluded from further 
analysis (n=1 HA). After achieving the criterion, participants proceeded to the testing phase. 
Each trial consisted in the presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen 
for 500ms, followed by the presentation of the pair of characters during which participants 
could provide their choice by pressing the corresponding key. Key press terminated stimulus 
presentation and participants had a maximum of 3000ms to provide their answer. This was 
followed by the feedback for 1000ms, followed by an inter trial interval of 1000-1500ms 
during which a blank screen was presented (Fig. 21). The order of presentation of stimuli was 
randomized across trials. The type of characters constituting each pair was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
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Figure 20. Illustration of experimental trial for the learning phase. 
 
Testing. This phase enabled to evaluate how the acquired learning affected choice behavior 
when the same characters are presented in a new context. So, the old pairs of characters were 
presented in addition to new pair of characters resulting from all the possible combinations of 
pairs of characters.  
On each trial a pair appeared on the screen and participants chose one of the two 
characters. No feedback was given about the choice. Participants’ task was to choose the 
character in each pair they thought was the correct one. Participants were also told to follow 
their instinct when they were not sure about which character to choose. 
Each trial consisted in the presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen 
for 500ms, followed by the presentation of the pair of characters during which participants 
could provide their choice by pressing the corresponding key. Key press terminated stimulus 
presentation and participants had a maximum of 3000ms to provide their answer. This was 
followed by an inter trial interval of 1000-1500ms during which a blank screen was presented 
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(Fig. 22). The order of presentation of stimuli was randomized across trials. There were 90 
trials in total (6 per pair). 
 
Figure 21. Illustration of experimental trial for the testing phase. 
 
Dependent measures 
Number of blocks completed during learning. The number of blocks completed in order to 
achieve the performance criterion was counted for each participant to then test whether there 
were any group differences. 
Early learning. The percentage of accurate response and average response times for accurate 
responses for the first block were evaluated to test differences between groups in early 
acquisition of learning (Waltz, Frank, Robinson, & Gold, 2007). 
Degree of exploration during early learning. The probability of changing response 
following either positive or negative feedback was calculated during the first block of 
learning in order to test group differences. 
Retaining of learning in a novel context. We verified that subjects retained the performance 
criterion for successful learning also during the testing phase, to ensure learning was retained. 
As a consequence, participants whose accuracy in choosing the correct character when faced 
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with old pairs (AB, CD or EF) did not equal the performance criterion were excluded from 
further analysis because their data were not interpretable. Then differences between groups in 
accuracy and response times for the old pairs were tested. 
Using what was learned, in a new context. On each trial, participants were faced with one 
out of four possible types of choice (Table 3). First, they could be faced by a pair consisting 
of one correct character and one incorrect character (conflict of choice: low conflict) and 
where the probability of the correct stimulus of having been rewarded was greater than the 
probability of the incorrect stimulus of having been punished (type of choice: choose 
positive). This included AD, AF and CF pairs. Second, they could be faced by a pair 
consisting of one correct character and one incorrect character (conflict of choice: low 
conflict) and where the probability of the incorrect stimulus of having been punished was 
greater than the probability of the correct stimulus of having been rewarded (type of choice: 
avoid negative). This included BC, BE and DE pairs. Third, they could be faced by a pair 
consisting of two correct characters (conflict of choice: high conflict) and where one had 
higher probability of having been previously rewarded compared to the other (type of choice: 
choose positive). This included AC, AE and CE pairs. Four, they could be faced by a pair 
consisting of two incorrect characters (conflict of choice: high conflict) and where one had 
higher probability of having been previously punished compared to the other (type of choice: 
avoid negative). This included BD, BF and DF pairs. The percentage of accurate response 
and the average response time for accurate choices for each participant and for each type of 
choice were calculated to test differences in performance between groups during testing. 
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Table 3. Illustration of the different types of choice during the testing phase 
Stimulus  Value of stimuli  Conflict of choice  Type of choice  
AC  
A: 80% positive  
C: 70% positive  
High  Choose positive  
AD  
A: 80% positive  
D: 70% negative  
Low  Choose positive  
AE  
A: 80% positive  
E: 60% positive  
High  Choose positive  
AF  
A: 80% positive  
F: 60% negative  
Low  Choose positive  
BC  
B: 80% negative  
C: 70% positive  
Low  Avoid negative  
BD  
B: 80% negative  
D: 70% negative  
High  Avoid negative  
BE  
B: 80% negative  
E: 60% positive  
Low  Avoid negative  
BF  
B: 80% negative  
F: 60% negative  
High  Avoid negative  
CE  
C: 70% positive  
E: 60% positive  
High  Choose positive  
CF  
C: 70% positive  
F: 60% negative  
Low  Choose positive  
DE  
D: 70% negative  
E: 60% positive  
Low  Avoid negative  
DF  
D: 70% negative  
F: 60% negative  
High  Avoid negative  
 
Results 
No difference in the number of blocks required to complete learning 
An independent sample t-test showed no significant difference between the two groups in the 
average number of blocks completed to achieve the performance criterion (t(38)=1.09, 
p=.281; Mlow=1.90, Mhigh=1.60). The groups required a comparable number of blocks to 
achieve the performance criterion. 
No difference in the degree of exploration during early learning 
A 3x2x2 RM ANOVA (type of pair: AB, CD, EF; type of feedback: correct, incorrect; group: 
LA, HA) showed a significant main effect of type of feedback (F(1, 38)=29.26, p<.001, 
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partial η2=.43). Newman-Keuls post-hoc comparison indicated that on any given trial, 
participants were more likely to switch choice towards the other character in the pair, if they 
had received incorrect feedback in the previous trial for the same pair than if they had 
received correct feedback (p<.001, Mpositive=.18, Mnegative=.31). In addition, there was no main 
effect or interaction with the factor group (all ps≥.270) indicating that groups had comparable 
degree of exploration while learning the correct character in each pair. 
HA tend to be slower in choosing the correct character in the EF than CD pair 
A 3x2 RM ANOVA on the accuracy (type of pair: AB, CD, EF; group: LA, HA) showed a 
main effect of the type of pair (F(2, 76)=5.38, p=.006, partial η2=.12). Newman-Keuls post-
hoc comparison indicated that at the end of the first block participants achieved lower 
response accuracy to the EF (M=.640) pair compared to AB (M=.787; p=.008) and CD 
(M=.762; p=.013), while there was no significant difference in the accuracy between the 
response to AB and CD (p=.605). In addition, there was no main effect or interaction with the 
factor group (all ps≥.818) indicating that at the end of the first block groups had comparable 
acquisition of learning. 
Next, we tested differences in response times for correct trials. Note that only subjects 
with valid response times were included (i.e. participants with at least one accurate response 
on any pair). A 3x2 RM ANOVA (type of pair: AB, CD, EF; group: LA, HA) showed a trend 
for a pair by group interaction (F(2,72)=3.06, p=.053, partial η2=.08). Newman-Keuls post-
hoc comparison indicated that, while LA had no difference in response times between the 
three pairs (all ps≥.218), there was a tendency in HA to be slower in choosing the correct 
character in the EF pair (M=1299.1ms) compared to the CD pair (M=1167.7ms, p=.075; Fig. 
23). All other within-group comparisons were not significant (p≥.162). 
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Figure 22. Mean response time for each stimulus pair as a function of alexithymia group. In the high alexithymia group, 
participants were slower in choosing the correct character in the EF than in the CD pair. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
No difference in retaining of learning in a novel context 
First, 1 LA and 3 HA were not able to retain the acquired learning and were excluded from 
further analysis. 
A 3x2 RM ANOVA on the accuracy (type of pair: AB, CD, EF; group: LA, HA) showed a 
main effect of the type of pair (F(2, 68)=4.46, p=.015, partial η2=.11). Newman-Keuls post 
hoc comparisons showed that participants were less accurate in responding to the EF (M=.89) 
pair compared to AB (M=.97, p=.013) and CD (M=.95, p=.039), while there was no 
difference in accuracy between AB and CD (p=.420). There was no main effect or interaction 
with the factor group (all ps≥.376), indicating that HA and LA retained learning to a 
comparable level. 
The 3x2 RM ANOVA on the response times, also showed no difference between groups as 
well as no difference between stimulus pairs (all ps≥.090). 
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HA require more time to avoid a negative stimulus than choosing a positive one, when in a 
novel context  
The 2x2x2 RM ANOVA (type of learning: choose positive, avoid negative; type of conflict: 
low conflict, high conflict; group: LA, HA) on mean accuracy showed a significant main 
effect of conflict (F(1,34)=97.09, p<.001, partial η2=.74). Newman-Keuls post hoc 
comparisons showed that participants were less accurate when facing pairs with high conflict 
choice (M=.91) than low conflict choice (M=.55; p<.001). 
The 2x2x2 RM ANOVA (type of learning: choose positive, avoid negative; type of conflict: 
low conflict, high conflict; group: LA, HA) on the reaction times showed a significant 
valence by conflict interaction (F(1,34)=14.56, p<.001, partial η2=.30). Newman-Keuls post 
hoc comparisons showed that participants were slower in a high conflict choice, specifically 
when accurately avoiding the most negative character in a pair of two negative characters 
than when having to make any other choice (all ps<.001). Crucially, there was a significant 
valence by group interaction (F(1,34)=4.38, p=.044, partial η2=.11). Newman-Keuls post hoc 
comparisons showed that HA were slower when accurately avoiding a negative stimulus 
(M=1396.8ms) than when choosing a positive one (M=1095.3, p<.001), while LA had no 
significant difference when faced by these two choices (Mnegative=1017.5, Mpositive=113.9, 
p=.357; Fig. 24). All other comparisons were not significant (all ps≥.098). This result 
suggests that HA require more time to avoid a negative stimulus compared to choosing a 
positive one, when in a novel context. On the contrary, LA require comparable amount of 
time to make either type of choice. 
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Figure 23. Mean response time for the ‘choose positive’ and ‘avoid negative’ conditions as a function of alexithymia group. 
In the high alexithymia group, participants were slower when avoiding the negative than when choosing the positive 
stimulus. Error bars represent standard errors. Significant differences are indicated as follows: ***p< .001. 
 
Discussion 
The current experiment tested the effect of alexithymia on participants’ ability to learn from 
reward and punishment in an instrumental learning task, the ability to retain the acquired 
learning and the ability to use the information learned about the value of stimuli flexibly to 
make adaptive choices, when such stimuli are encountered in a novel context. 
First of all, the main results were in line with previous literature. During learning, 
participants were more likely to change choice of character in a pair if their previous choice 
received incorrect than if it received correct feedback (Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, & 
Hutchison, 2007), indicating that the two types of feedback were effective as punishment and 
reward. Indeed, participants changed their behavior according to the feedback received 
repeating rewarded choices and diminishing punished ones. During testing, the analysis on 
accuracy showed that participants were equally accurate in choosing positive and avoid 
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negative stimuli, replicating Frank et al. (2007, 2005) but less accurate in making the correct 
choice in high conflict than in low conflict situation, when faced with the new pairs. Indeed, 
having to choose between one positive and one negative stimulus seems easier that having to 
choose between two positive or two negative stimuli, which differ only in their reinforcement 
rate. In addition, the analysis on reaction times showed that participants were slower when 
having to avoid the most negative stimulus among two negative ones than when making any 
other choice. Together these data suggest that making the correct choice in low conflict 
situation is easier than in high conflict situation and, in particular, when faced by two 
negative stimuli, participants require more time to maintain accuracy comparable to when 
choosing between two positive stimuli, suggesting the former may represent the overall most 
difficult choice.    
Regarding group differences, initial hypotheses were only partially supported. During 
learning, the two groups did not differ significantly in the number of blocks completed to 
learn the value of stimuli, the degree of exploration following reward or punishment, and the 
accuracy in identifying the correct character in each pair. Nevertheless, analysis on reaction 
time, showed that HA, but not LA, had a tendency to be slower, during the early phase of 
learning, when accurately identifying the correct character in the EF than in the CD pair. 
Importantly, while in the CD pair, the percentage difference in reinforcement rate between 
characters was 40%, in the EF pair, the percentage difference in reinforcement rate between 
characters was only 20%. Therefore, as difference in reinforcement rate between two stimuli 
decreases, HA may find increasingly difficult to learn the value of individual stimuli and 
associated actions, requiring more time to maintain choice accuracy. During testing, three HA 
but only one LA did not retain the learned value of the characters, possibly suggesting more 
HA may have difficulties in retaining the internal representation of the value of stimuli and 
actions, once these are no more reinforced. Despite this, HA and LA who retained learning 
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did not differ in choice behavior to old pairs of characters. However, when faced by new 
pairs of characters, although groups showed comparable accuracy in choice behavior, the 
analysis on response times indicated a difficulty of HA in efficiently avoiding characters, 
which had acquired negative value, encountered in a new context. Indeed, while LA were 
equally efficient in avoiding negative or choosing positive characters, HA were slower when 
accurately avoiding negative characters than when choosing positive ones, regardless of the 
level of conflict involved in the choice. Therefore, HA may find more difficult to effectively 
avoid previously learned negative stimuli encountered in a new context than choosing 
positive ones. This may also suggest that, although during the learning phase HA were able to 
learn to differentiate the positive from the negative stimulus in each pair of character, the 
quality of such learning may have differed between the two stimuli, being relatively weaker 
for the negative stimuli, becoming evident during the testing phase. 
Previous studies suggest that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a significant role in 
relative performance between choosing positive/avoid negative stimuli in the current task. 
Indeed, while healthy controls show no difference in performance between the two 
conditions, patients with Parkinson’s show a change in performance depending on their 
current medication status. When on medication, they are relatively better at choosing positive 
than avoiding negative stimuli in the new context, while they show the opposite pattern when 
off medication (Frank et al., 2004). This is because during learning, on medication, the 
neurotransmitter would be sufficient to enable dopamine bursts following positive feedback, 
promoting learning the value of positive stimuli, but it would also block the effect of 
dopamine dips following negative feedback, because of the prolonged occupancy of 
dopamine receptors, hindering learning the value of negative stimuli. Off medication, instead, 
such dopamine bursts cannot occur resulting in the opposite learning pattern (Maia & Frank, 
2011). In addition, the ability to avoid negative stimuli, in particular, seems to be related to 
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differences in genotype associated to density of postsynaptic D2 receptors, which are crucial 
for learning from low dopamine levels, as it is the case in response to negative feedback 
(Frank et al., 2004). Indeed, performance in avoiding negative stimuli increasing with 
increasing density of D2 receptors (Frank et al., 2007), and decreases in individuals carrying 
an allele of a genetic polymorphism associated with a reduction in D2 receptor density by up 
to 30% (Klein et al., 2007). Therefore, it might be possible that alexithymia may be related to 
differences in the dopamine system and in particular in those aspects supporting learning 
from negative feedback. 
 To conclude, the results of the current experiment suggest that alexithymia may be 
related to a difficulty in learning the individual value of two stimuli and the actions 
associated to them as difference in reinforcement rate between them decreases. In addition, 
individuals with alexithymia also have a difficulty in learning from punishment, which 
becomes evident when having to avoid stimuli, which had previously acquired aversive 
emotional value, encountered in a novel context.  
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Conclusion  
In summary, the four experiments presented in this chapter show that alexithymia is related to 
a difficulty in emotional learning. Individuals with alexithymia appear less able to learn the 
contingencies between neutral stimuli and actions and their emotional consequences, 
ultimately failing constructing accurate internal representations of emotional stimuli. 
Disruption in this process may represent a unifying mechanism underling the difficulties in 
emotion processing observed in alexithymia. Indeed, having accurate internal representations 
of emotional stimuli enables their prediction and preparation to respond to them (McNally & 
Westbrook, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This is not only crucial for effective recognition, 
response and response regulation to the emotional stimulus per se, but also for anticipating 
the consequences of the emotional event enabling optimal decision making (Bubic et al., 
2010). 
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Chapter 5. General discussion: Rethinking alexithymia 
Alexithymia is a personality trait characterized by difficulty in identifying feelings, in 
describing them to others and a type of thinking focused more on concrete aspects regarding 
the external environment than on introspection (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor et al., 1991). As 
reviewed in Chapter 1, alexithymia is related to a broad range of difficulties in processing 
emotional stimuli and in Chapter 3 two experiments contributed to this literature. In 
particular, Experiment 1 showed that alexithymia has a widespread impact on the emotional 
life of individuals, being related to lower emotional intelligence, empathy and psychological 
wellbeing, supporting the significance of studying this personality trait. In addition, 
Experiment 2 focused on the perception of emotional facial expressions, showing that 
alexithymia is related to the need for more emotional intensity to identify fear in emotional 
facial expressions, extending the previous literature that had shown alexithymia is related to 
the need for more time to identify emotions in facial expressions (Grynberg et al., 2012). 
Although this evidence significantly extends the literature dedicated to the description of the 
difficulties in emotion processing of alexithymia, the basic mechanisms that may underlie 
such difficulties remain poorly understood. Nevertheless, this type of investigation could 
provide new insight in the conceptualization of this personality trait.  
 The internal representations of emotional stimuli in alexithymia 
A basic mechanism that is crucial to process emotional stimuli successfully is emotional 
learning. As discussed in Chapter 2, in our daily life countless stimuli can elicit an emotional 
response, nevertheless only a restricted range of stimuli is biologically programmed to do so 
(LeDoux, 1998). However, to increase the chances of survival, through emotional learning, 
we can shape the internal representations of stimuli in order to attribute them emotional value 
because of their association with appetitive and aversive stimuli. By doing so, emotional 
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learning supports the construction of an internal model of emotional stimuli, which can be 
used to predict the emotional future, anticipating coming appetitive and aversive stimuli and 
preparing the organism to respond to them effectively (Bubic et al., 2010; McNally & 
Westbrook, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). For this reason, the remaining experiments 
investigated the possible differences in the construction of internal representations of 
emotional events, examining the process of emotional learning in alexithymia. 
Unstable and imprecise internal representations of emotional stimuli shown by psycho-, 
electro-physiological signals and behaviors 
The experiments in Chapter 4 showed that alexithymia is related to impairments in different 
aspects of emotional learning. Specifically, Experiment 3 focused on learning from aversive 
stimuli, showing that alexithymia is related to a reduction of physiological markers of 
emotional prediction when anticipating aversive stimuli during Pavlovian conditioning. 
Importantly, here alexithymia was not related to a difference in the physiological changes 
elicited by the aversive stimulus per se, rather individuals with alexithymia had difficulty in 
learning to transfer the emotional response triggered by the aversive stimulus on a neutral 
stimulus associated with it, suggesting impairment in constructing accurate internal 
representations of aversive stimuli. Experiment 4 used a similar paradigm to look at 
differences in physiological markers of emotional prediction, when anticipating appetitive 
stimuli. Nevertheless, here no difference was found in relation to alexithymia, suggesting that 
the physiological markers of emotional prediction may be spared when facing appetitive 
stimuli. Nevertheless, in Experiment 5, when electrophysiological markers of emotional 
predictions were investigated during reward conditioning, alexithymia showed decreased 
anticipation of coming appetitive stimuli. This was accompanied also by absent markers of 
prediction error in response to unexpected feedback related to the appetitive stimuli. These 
results suggest a broken feedback loop, in which individuals with alexithymia may attribute 
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less motivational salience and devote less attention to the stimuli that predict appetitive 
emotional stimuli, showing reduced prediction of the latter. This may then lead to absent 
prediction error and failure in correcting the inaccurate prediction, enhancing the reduced 
prediction. Furthermore, this was accompanied by less accurate verbal report regarding the 
stimulus-reinforcer. Finally, Experiment 6 examined the ability to learn the emotional value 
of actions, in addition to that of stimuli, by having participants complete an instrumental 
learning task. Furthermore, this experiment also investigated the ability to use the internal 
representation of the emotional value of stimuli and actions acquired in one context, to ensure 
adaptive behavior when the same stimuli are encountered in a novel context. Here, the results 
showed that alexithymia was mainly related to two difficulties. The first was a difficulty in 
learning the individual value of stimuli and the actions associated to them as the difference in 
reinforcement rate between the stimuli decreased. The second was a difficulty in learning 
from punishment, which became evident when having to avoid stimuli, which had previously 
acquired aversive emotional value, encountered in a novel context. Indeed, individuals with 
alexithymia were slower when accurately avoiding stimuli that had acquired negative value 
than when choosing those that had acquired positive value. On the contrary, such difference 
in performance was not found in individuals without alexithymia, who were equally efficient 
in avoiding negative or choosing positive stimuli. 
Together, the data suggest that alexithymia is related to an inability to construct 
accurate internal representations of emotional events and actions, failing to adaptively expand 
the representations of emotional stimuli by attributing emotional value not only to appetitive 
and aversive unconditioned stimuli but also to the stimuli that predict them. In particular, the 
internal representations appeared unstable and imprecise. The former was suggested by the 
enhanced extinction of threat conditioning, once the value of the conditioned stimulus was no 
more reinforced by the aversive event, and by a higher rate of participants with alexithymia 
114 
 
being unable to retain the emotional value of stimuli and actions, learned during instrumental 
learning, in a subsequent testing phase. The latter was suggested by decreased predictions 
during aversive and appetitive conditioning, the absence of prediction error during appetitive 
conditioning and the difficulty in learning the value of individual stimuli, as differences in 
reinforcement rate between stimuli decreased. 
The internal representations of aversive stimuli may be more severely affected than for 
appetitive stimuli 
In addition, the current data on emotional learning seem to suggest that, in alexithymia, the 
internal representations of emotional stimuli may be differentially affected depending on their 
valence. Specifically, the representation of aversive emotional stimuli may be more severely 
affected than that of appetitive stimuli. Indeed, the data from Experiment 3 and 4 showed that 
the physiological marker of emotional prediction was decreased in alexithymia for aversive 
but not for appetitive stimuli. Also, in Experiment 6, alexithymia was related to a difficulty in 
learning from punishment but not from reward, during instrumental leaning. 
This difference in results may be explained by the fact that the neural circuits 
involved in emotional learning present substantial overlap but also significant differences 
when it comes to encoding stimulus valence. For example, although some neurons in the 
basolateral complex of the amygdala respond to both appetitive and aversive stimuli, others 
respond preferentially to one valence over the other and these project to different output 
regions (Beyeler et al., 2016; Namburi et al., 2015). In particular, only those preferentially 
responding to aversive stimuli project to the central amygdala, whose connections to the 
hypothalamus appear to drive the physiological arousal in anticipation of threat (Cardinal et 
al., 2002; McNally & Westbrook, 2006). For this reason, it is possible that 
psychophysiological changes in anticipation of emotional stimuli may be differentially 
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affected by alexithymia depending on the valence of the emotional stimulus, as suggested by 
the reduced skin conductance response in anticipation of shock, in Experiment 3, but not of 
monetary reward, in Experiment 4. In addition, with regards to behavioral changes triggered 
by emotional stimuli, although dopamine may drive both approach of appetitive stimuli and 
avoidance of aversive ones, it seems to do so acting on different dopamine receptors, D1 
receptors would mediate approach behavior while D2 avoidance behavior (Frank et al., 
2007). Therefore, it is also possible for alexithymia to impair avoidance behavior of aversive 
stimuli but not approach behavior for positive ones, as suggested by the slower response time 
when avoiding negative stimuli compared to when choosing positive ones in Experiment 6. 
Such discrepancy, between the construction of internal representations of aversive and 
appetitive emotional stimuli, appears in line with the broader literature on alexithymia, which 
has suggested that alexithymia may be associated with more difficulties in processing 
aversive as opposed to appetitive emotional stimuli. For example, individuals with 
alexithymia rate the expression of fearful faces, but not happy ones, as less intense (Prkachin 
et al., 2009), and fail to show enhanced remapping of fear on their own somatosensory 
system compared to those with no alexithymia, while the remapping of happiness remains 
comparable between the two groups (Scarpazza et al., 2014). Also in the current thesis, 
Experiment 2 showed that participants with alexithymia needed more emotional intensity to 
identify fear in emotional facial expressions, but not happiness. Moreover, studies 
investigating the neural response to emotional stimuli, found decreased activation of the 
amygdala in alexithymia, which seems to be specific to aversive stimuli, including fearful 
bodies and observation of pain in others (Kugel et al., 2008; Pouga et al., 2010; Reker et al., 
2010; van der Velde et al., 2014).  
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Decoupling between psycho- and electro-physiological signals and subjective reports 
Contrary to what might have been expected, no evidence was found that the subjective report 
of the emotional experience during the presentation of conditioned stimuli was affected in 
alexithymia. This was true both when participants were provided with an emotional word 
(e.g. fear, happiness) and they had to rate the intensity of the corresponding emotional 
experience (Experiment 3, 4), as well as when participants were asked to indicate the value 
attributed to the stimuli, rating how much they liked them (Experiment 5). This difference in 
results deserves further discussion because it is informative not only for the understanding of 
alexithymia, but also to extend the literature on the construction of internal representations of 
emotional stimuli. 
First of all, this difference suggests that the processes giving rise to 
psychophysiological and electrophysiological signals, assessed here, in response to the 
conditioned stimuli, are partly dissociated from those giving rise to the subjective emotional 
experience associated with them. Indeed, the neural circuits eliciting the physiological 
changes in response to emotional stimuli have been proposed to mainly involve subcortical 
regions, while those eliciting the conscious subjective emotional experience to mainly 
involve cortical regions (LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Hofmann, 
2018). For example, neuroimaging evidence shows that, while the amygdala is active also in 
lack of awareness for aversive stimuli, the insula is only active when participants are aware of 
the threat (Critchley et al., 2002). Therefore, while the amygdala would be more relevant for 
the implicit processing of emotional stimuli and elicitation of psychophysiological changes in 
response to them, the insula may be more relevant for their cognitive representation of the 
subjective emotional experience (Critchley et al., 2002; LeDoux, 2007). In particular, with 
regard to the shock administered in Experiment 3, the nociceptive information conveyed by 
the shock is processed by multiple neural pathways. On one side, the nociceptive information 
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would reach the basolateral complex of the amygdala (Paton et al., 2006), whose projections 
would then influence the central complex of the amygdala and then, through its connections 
with hypothalamus, elicit the physiological changes in response to the conditioned stimuli 
(Cardinal et al., 2002; McNally & Westbrook, 2006). On the other side, the nociceptive 
information would also reach the insula (Craig, 2002, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004). The 
insula then may modulate the physiological changes elicited by the amygdala because of its 
connections with this structure (Phelps et al., 2001), but, more importantly, appears involved 
in the cognitive representation of physical sensations as affective states (Barrett, 2017b) and 
the conscious subjective experience of emotion (LeDoux & Brown, 2017), as suggested by 
stronger response of this region in instructed compared to pavlovian threat learning, where 
the unconditioned stimulus is expected but never experienced (Phelps et al., 2001). In 
addition, the subjective emotional experience, would not only arise from the cognitive 
interpretation of this nociceptive information, but also from the integration in working 
memory of this information together with additional interoceptive information as well as 
information coming from other sources, such as the external environment or semantic 
knowledge (LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). Therefore, 
focusing on Experiment 3, the cognitive interpretation of the nociceptive information, 
processed by the insula, may also have been integrated with information from these other 
sources, to give rise to a subjective emotional experience, which did not arise directly from 
the physiological response elicited by the emotional stimuli. In sum, the current data support 
dissociation between the physiological changes and the subjective emotional experience to 
emotional stimuli. 
Turning to the understanding of alexithymia, the data may suggest that alexithymia 
affects the physiological response to conditioned stimuli sparing the subjective emotional 
experience, contrasting with the ‘blind-feel’ hypothesis of alexithymia, which argues that 
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alexithymia would be characterized by an intact physiological response to emotional stimuli 
and a deficit in emotion concept representation (Lane et al., 1997). However, the picture 
seems more complex than this, because the  current data should be considered in light of the 
previous literature, which found both comparable (Bausch et al., 2011; Easterbrooks et al., 
2005; Stone & Nielson, 2001) and decreased (Bermond et al., 2010; Franz et al., 2003; 
Neumann et al., 2004; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2008) physiological 
response to emotional stimuli together with no difference (Franz et al., 2003), increased 
(Eastabrook et al., 2013; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2011) or decreased (Stone 
& Nielson, 2001) subjective reports of emotional experience. Therefore, alexithymia may 
affect one level, the other or both depending on the experimental conditions. In the present 
experiments, it may indeed be possible that the subjective emotional experience may have not 
been affected by alexithymia. Nevertheless, given the contribution of multiple sources of 
information to the subjective emotional experience, it is also possible that participants with 
alexithymia may have relied on information from the external context, when providing the 
subjective reports of emotional experience, enabling them to obtain a report comparable to 
the individuals without alexithymia. In fact, two additional aspects should be taken into 
consideration when discussing these results. First, participants were provided with specific 
emotional words or dimensions and only needed to rate their intensity. It is possible, that if 
participants were faced by more open questions asking to describe what they experienced 
during the presentation of the stimuli, differences between groups may have been revealed, as 
it was the case for the assessment of explicit learning regarding the stimulus-feedback 
contingency in Experiment 5. In addition, Experiment 6 did not include a subjective report of 
emotional value attributed to the stimuli, which might also have revealed differences between 
groups. In fact, computing the value of the single stimuli in the experiment may have been 
more difficult compared to the other experiments, because of the higher number of stimuli 
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and their more subtle differences in reinforcement rates. Therefore, differences in subjective 
emotional experience in alexithymia may become evident, once individuals face conditions in 
which relying on information from the external environment becomes more challenging and 
they are required to rely primarily on information coming from bodily signals to construct 
their subjective emotional experience. This seems a plausible hypothesis, which could be 
tested by future studies, given the evidence that alexithymia is related to a general 
impairment in interoception, even in non-emotional context (Brewer et al., 2016; Murphy et 
al., 2017; Shah et al., 2016). 
Implications of the current results for the understanding of alexithymia 
The definition of alexithymia 
The current definition of alexithymia includes three aspects: difficulty in identifying feelings, 
difficulty in describing them to others and a type of thinking focused more on concrete 
aspects regarding the external environment rather than on introspection on the internal mental 
life (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor et al., 1991). 
  Regarding the identification and description of emotions, it is possible that the 
difficulties in this domain are not always apparent, as suggested by the results on the 
subjective emotional experience during emotional learning. However, these may become 
evident when conditions for processing emotional stimuli become challenging. Indeed, this 
was also suggested by the first two experiments. Specifically, in Experiment 1 there was no 
evidence that alexithymia was related to impairment in the identification of emotions 
expressed by facial expressions, when assessed on the performance measure of emotional 
intelligence; nevertheless, in Experiment 2, individuals with alexithymia needed more 
emotional intensity to perceive fear in facial expressions. One difference between the two 
tasks is that in Experiment 1 participants could take as much time as needed to observe the 
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face and choose their response, on the contrary in Experiment 2 the presentation of the face 
and the time for response was limited, possibly increasing the difficulty of the task. Indeed, 
previous literature has shown that alexithymia appears related to worse performance in 
recognition of emotional facial expressions under temporal constraints (Ihme, Sacher, Lichev, 
Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, Lane, et al., 2014; 
Swart et al., 2009), which can be restored when stimulus exposure time is extended (Ihme, 
Sacher, Lichev, Rosenberg, Kugel, Rufer, Grabe, Pampel, Lepsien, Kersting, Villringer, & 
Suslow, 2014; Pandey & Mandal, 1997; P. D. Parker et al., 2005), corroborating the idea that 
the difficulty in identifying feelings may be manifested only under specific conditions. 
 More interesting appears the third factor of alexithymia, namely externally oriented 
thinking, which is described as a cognitive style focused more on concrete events rather than 
on introspection and has been associated with an impoverished fantasy life and imaginative 
capacity (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor et al., 1991). In this regard, the ability to construct internal 
representations of stimuli in the environment through learning is not only crucial for 
predicting the future, but also for imagination and mental imagery more in general (Bubic et 
al., 2010; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Weber et al., 2017). So it is 
possible that this third factor, which describes alexithymia, may be a manifestation of the 
impairment in constructing accurate internal representations of emotional stimuli. To test 
whether alexithymia is indeed related to poor imaginative capacity, individuals with and 
without alexithymia could be assessed on a mental imagery task (e.g. Bertossi, Aleo, 
Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007).  In particular, 
because only the internal representation of emotional stimuli should be impaired in 
alexithymia, alexithymia could be hypothesized to be related to decreased richness of 
emotions included in imaginary scenarios but comparable richness of concrete aspects of the 
scenarios, such as the presence of objects or entities. 
121 
 
The difficulties in emotion processing 
Having accurate internal representations of emotional stimuli is crucial to predict the 
emotional future, so that organisms can appropriately prepare to respond to emotional stimuli, 
rather than simply reacting to them once they have occurred (McNally & Westbrook, 2006; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001). These predictive representations enable effective recognition, 
response and response regulation to the emotional stimulus and optimal decision making 
(Bubic et al., 2010). Therefore, the unstable and imprecise internal representations, shown by 
psycho-, electro-physiological and behavioral markers, in alexithymia may represent a 
unifying mechanism underling the difficulties observed in multiple aspects of emotion 
processing. Indeed, results from the first two experiments corroborate this. 
Regarding the recognition of emotional stimuli, in Experiment 2, alexithymia was 
related to the need for more emotional intensity to perceive fear in emotional facial 
expressions. Because emotional faces are learned emotional stimuli (Barrett, 2017a), this 
result may have been a manifestation of an underlying imprecise internal representation of 
fearful faces. A detailed representation would be required to be able to perceive the somatic 
features, which define such emotional expression, also when not displayed at full intensity. 
Regarding the regulation of emotional response, in Experiment 1, alexithymia was 
negatively correlated with the ability to manage emotions, measured on a performance 
measure of emotional intelligence. In order to successfully complete this task, participants are 
required to abstract their knowledge about emotional stimuli and apply it to a hypothetical 
emotional situation, in order to find the best strategy to manage it. This abstraction can be 
achieved only with an accurate internal representation of emotional stimuli, which act as a 
general model to be applied also to theoretical scenarios in the lack of experiential 
information. In addition, alexithymia was positively correlated with personal distress 
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experienced during emotionally charged situations measured on an empathy questionnaire. 
The higher the alexithymia, the more the person was overwhelmed by the emotional distress 
of others’. This may also be related to the lack of an accurate predictive internal model, 
which can facilitate the preparation to deal with emotionally charged situations adaptively. 
Regarding decision making, the previous literature on alexithymia, has shown a 
relationship between this personality trait and differences in decision making. For example, in 
the context of risky decisions during a gambling task, participants with alexithymia show 
lower performance than those without alexithymia. In particular, participants were tested on 
the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003), in which they are presented 
with four decks of cards and have to learn to choose the decks that will maximize their profit. 
The decks have different reinforcement rates, with two decks leading primarily to loss of 
money while two to win of money. Usually, following an initial exploratory phase, 
participants learn to distinguish the different decks, directing their choice behavior 
preferentially towards the advantageous decks. Indeed, while this occurred in participants 
with low alexithymia, those with high alexithymia showed a different pattern of behavior. 
After the exploratory phase, they did shift their choice towards advantageous decks; 
nevertheless, this lasted only for a limited number of trials, showing another shift in choice 
behavior, returning to choose disadvantageous decks (Ferguson et al., 2009). The authors 
argued that the results suggest an inability of individuals with high alexithymia to consolidate 
learning due to a reduced sensitivity to monetary losses, which appears in line with what was 
found here in Experiment 6, with alexithymia being related to reduced ability to learn from 
punishment and avoid negative stimuli. Successful performance on the Iowa Gambling Task 
has also been related to the ability to produce appropriate physiological changes in 
anticipation of choice behavior, which would be necessary to accurately predict the outcome 
following the choice and guide behavior towards adaptive choices (Damasio, 2008). In 
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particular, during the task healthy participants generate changes in skin conductance 
response, following feedback about their decision indicating win or loss of money. As the 
task progresses, such changes can also be observed prior the decision, as participants think to 
the choice to make. Absence of this anticipatory response, following damage to the amygdala 
or ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is related to impaired performance in the task, with patients 
being unable to learn which the most adaptive choices are (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara, 
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). This evidence supports the importance of emotional 
learning and of psychophysiological markers of prediction of future outcomes for successful 
decision making. Therefore, the reduced performance in the Iowa Gabling Task in 
alexithymia, found by Ferguson et al. (2009), may be a manifestation of an underlying 
impairment in the production of appropriate psychophysiological markers of prediction of 
future negative outcomes. Indeed, this was shown by Experiment 3, where participants with 
alexithymia exhibited reduced skin conductance response in anticipation of an aversive 
stimulus and enhanced extinction of this response indicating impairment in maintaining the 
prediction of the aversive stimulus even in absence of emotional reinforcement.  
The underlying brain mechanisms 
From the literature reviewed in the first two chapters, an overlap between the brain areas that 
play a role in alexithymia and emotional learning appeared evident, in particular, the 
amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula, in keeping with the idea that the areas 
involved in the construction of internal representations of emotional stimuli are also more 
broadly involved in processing such stimuli. Thanks to the dependent measures assessed here, 
some considerations can be made also regarding the possible brain mechanisms involved in 
alexithymia, though they remain more speculative given that no measure of regional brain 
activity was collected. 
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With regard to the amygdala, given its crucial role in the generation of skin 
conductance response in anticipation of threat (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1998, 1995; 
Phelps & LeDoux, 2005), the decreased psychophysiological arousal found in alexithymia in 
anticipation of shock, in Experiment 3, may indicate reduced activity in this structure. This 
would be in line with the previous literature on alexithymia, which has reported decreased 
activation of the amygdala in response to the presentation of emotional facial expressions 
(Jongen et al., 2014; Kugel et al., 2008), negative emotional stimuli (Moriguchi & Komaki, 
2013; van der Velde et al., 2013; Wingbermühle et al., 2012) and in particular fearful ones 
(Pouga et al., 2010).  
Regarding the anterior cingulate cortex, the absence of modulation of feedback related 
negativity evidenced by the electrophysiological recording in Experiment 5, would suggest 
differences in activity in this region, as this component is generally related to activity in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd et al., 2004; Warren et al., 2015). This would also be in 
line with previous evidence from the broader literature on alexithymia (van der Velde et al., 
2013), although the direction of such differences remains unclear, as neuroimaging studies 
have found both increased (Mériau et al., 2006; Pouga et al., 2010) and decreased (Moriguchi 
et al., 2007) activation of this region in alexithymia.  
Regarding the insula, its role in emotional learning appears to be broader than the 
other two regions, since it may not only be involved in processing he sensory information 
conveyed by unconditioned stimuli, such as nociceptive information conveyed by shock 
(Craig, 2002, 2003; Critchley et al., 2004), but it also may be involved in the cognitive 
representation of subjective emotional experience (Barrett, 2017b; LeDoux & Brown, 2017). 
Given that, here, in Experiment 2 no evidence for differences in the intensity of the shock 
received and the subjective reports of emotional experience was found in alexithymia, it is 
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possible that the functionality of the insula may remain spared in these tasks in alexithymia. 
Nevertheless, the literature on alexithymia has previously found changes in insula activation, 
though both increased (Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Wiebking & Northoff, 2015) 
and decreased insula activation (Reker et al., 2010) have been reported. Therefore, the role of 
this area in the emotional learning in alexithymia should be clarified. 
 In addition, the results of the present experiments seem to suggest possible differences 
in the dopamine system in alexithymia. Indeed, dopamine plays a crucial role in learning both 
from appetitive and aversive stimuli, so that when such stimuli occur unpredicted, phasic 
changes in dopamine release act as a teaching signal, coding a prediction error that enables 
the construction of accurate internal representations of emotional events (Schultz, 2016; 
Wenzel, Rauscher, Cheer, & Oleson, 2015). In particular, the amplitude of the CUE-P300 
and FRN, assessed in Experiment 5, and the efficiency in avoiding negative stimuli, assessed 
in Experiment 6, have been previously put in relationship with the dopaminergic system and  
the density of D2 dopamine receptors (Berman et al., 2006; Frank et al., 2007, 2004; Maia & 
Frank, 2011; McKetin et al., 1999; Mulert et al., 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Pfabigan et 
al., 2014; Pogarell et al., 2011; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). So, the 
decreased amplitude of the CUE-P300 and FRN and lower performance in avoiding negative 
stimuli found in alexithymia may suggest decreased density of D2 dopamine receptors, which 
may then impair the functionality of the dopamine teaching signal. In this regard, one study 
found that carriers of an allele associated with a reduction in D2 dopamine receptor, together 
with an allele associated with lower activity-dependent secretion of brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor, had significantly higher scores of alexithymia, compared to participants 
with other allelic variations (Klein et al., 2007). Therefore, there is preliminary evidence of 
the involvement of the dopamine system in alexithymia and future studies could further 
explore the relationship between differences in the dopamine system and alexithymia.  
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 Final remarks 
 In sum, the present thesis contributed to extend the current literature on the description and 
understanding of alexithymia, a personality trait defined by difficulty in identifying feelings, 
in describing them and a type of thinking focused on concrete aspects rather than on 
introspection (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor et al., 1991). As shown by Experiment 1, alexithymia 
has a significant impact on the life of individuals, being related to lower emotional 
intelligence, empathy and psychological wellbeing, highlighting the importance of studying 
this personality trait. In addition, when focusing on the perception of emotions, alexithymia 
appears related, not only to the need for more time, as previously shown (Grynberg et al., 
2012), but also to the need for more emotional intensity to identify fear in facial expressions, 
as shown by Experiment 2. Although these experiments extend the current literature 
describing the difficulties of alexithymia in processing emotional stimuli, the basic 
mechanisms underlying such difficulties remain poorly understood.  
For this reason, the remaining of the thesis focused on investigating one mechanism 
that may underlie such difficulties, namely emotional learning. Indeed, through emotional 
learning, the internal representation of stimuli is shaped, so that neutral stimuli acquire 
emotional value. As such, emotional learning supports the construction of an internal model 
of emotional stimuli, which is used to predict the emotional future, in order to respond 
effectively to coming emotional stimuli (Bubic et al., 2010; McNally & Westbrook, 2006; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Therefore, impairment in emotional learning may then compromise 
processing of emotional stimuli. In fact, impairment in this process has been reported in 
clinical conditions marked by difficulties in emotion processing, such as depression 
(Greenberg et al., 2015) or anxiety (Lissek et al., 2005, 2014); nevertheless, this has never 
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been investigated in alexithymia before. Here, four experiments were dedicated to this 
investigation. 
Experiment 3 showed that alexithymia is related to impairment in learning the 
aversive value of stimuli, evidenced by reduced physiological markers of emotional 
prediction in Pavlovian threat conditioning. On the contrary, such evidence was not found in 
Experiment 4 when physiological markers of emotional prediction were assessed during 
Pavlovian reward conditioning. Despite this, evidence for impairment in learning appetitive 
value of stimuli, in alexithymia, was found in Experiment 5, where electrophysiological 
markers of emotional prediction and prediction error were assessed during Pavlovian reward 
conditioning. Finally, Experiment 6 examined the ability to learn the emotional value of 
actions during instrumental learning, and to use this learned value for adaptive behavior in a 
new context. Alexithymia was related to a difficulty in learning from punishment, marked by 
longer response time when having to avoid stimuli, which had previously acquired aversive 
value, encountered in a new context. Considered together, these results indicate impairment 
in emotional learning in alexithymia. In other words, alexithymia appears related to 
impairment in attributing emotional value to previously neutral stimuli and aberrant internal 
representations of such stimuli. In addition, this impairment may be more severe when 
learning the value of aversive than appetitive stimuli, in line with the broader literature on 
alexithymia, which reported altered processing of negative stimuli, while processing of 
positive stimuli may be partly spared (e.g. Kugel et al., 2008; Pouga et al., 2010; Prkachin et 
al., 2009; Reker et al., 2010; Scarpazza et al., 2014; van der Velde et al., 2014). 
Contrary to the differences found in the psychophysiological and electrophysiological 
markers of emotional learning, no evidence was found that the subjective emotional 
experience during emotional learning was affected in alexithymia. The contrasting result, 
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between these different types of measures of emotional response, corroborates recent 
cognitive theories of emotion processing, which argue that the processes giving rise to 
psychophysiological and electrophysiological signals in response to emotional stimuli, are 
partly dissociated from those giving rise to the subjective emotional experience associated 
with them (Barrett, 2017b; Barrett et al., 2007; LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Brown, 2017; 
LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). In addition, turning to the understanding of alexithymia, the 
difference between the results of psychophysiological and electrophysiological markers and 
subjective emotional experience, may suggest that alexithymia may affect the former while 
sparing the latter aspect of processing of emotional stimuli. Nevertheless, it should also be 
remembered that the subjective emotional experience is constructed by the integration of 
information coming from multiple sources, both from the internal (i.e. bodily signals) and 
external environment (LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Brown, 2017; LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). 
Therefore, it is also possible that, despite the aberrant psychophysiological and 
electrophysiological markers of emotional learning, participants with alexithymia may have 
used contextual information to construct their subjective emotional experience, obtaining a 
report comparable to the individuals without alexithymia. Future studies could clarify 
whether differences in subjective emotional experience in alexithymia become evident, when 
individuals are required to rely primarily on bodily signals to construct their subjective 
emotional experience, which may indeed be possible, given that reduced interoception was 
previously found in alexithymia (Brewer et al., 2016; Murphy et al., 2017; Shah et al., 2016). 
Finally, the differences found in emotional learning in alexithymia also offer new 
insight into the understanding of alexithymia. Indeed, the difficulties in perceiving, 
responding and regulating the response to emotional stimuli as well as using them to make 
adaptive decisions found in the previous literature on alexithymia, may be the manifestation 
of underlying inaccurate internal representations of emotional stimuli. This seems also 
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supported by the common neural mechanisms underlying the difficulties in processing 
emotional stimuli and in emotional learning characteristic of alexithymia. In particular, the 
present results suggest possible differences in activity of the amygdala and anterior cingulate 
cortex in emotional learning in alexithymia, areas that have been previously pointed out 
among the neural correlates of alexithymia (van der Velde et al., 2013).  In addition, the 
results of the thesis suggest that differences in the dopamine system may underlie 
alexithymia, in line with preliminary evidence from a previous behavioral genetic study 
(Klein et al., 2007). Future research should further explore these aspects, in order to extend 
the understanding of the differences in the internal representations of emotional stimuli in 
alexithymia and their underlying neural mechanisms. 
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